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ABSTRACT
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the evolution of the role 
of the military in Turkish politics as the guardian of the state. In doing so, the 
thesis provides a comparative analysis of the 1960 and the 1980 military 
interventions. This comparison allows us to see that, although both 
interventions had aimed at bringing the ” rationalist democracy " back in the 
political life, each intervention employed a different conception of democracy; 
used it as a ground for the legitimacy of the intervention; and acted, in fact, as 
a decision-maker to restore state power and state autonomy.
The main argument of this thesis, which was constructed on and 
out of the comparison between the 1960 and 1980 military interventions, is 
that in a time when the military acts as a decision-maker and as a state elite, it 
functions as the guardian of the state. In order to subserve this argument, the 
thesis proceeds by delineating, in a detailed manner, the way in which each 
intervention was organised and attempted to restructure the political scene. It 
offers a comprehensive analysis of the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions in such a 
way as to demonstrate that, despite their differences, the military in each case 
placed the need to guard the state- its power and autonomy- at the apex of the 
political stage of Turkey.
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ÖZET
Bu tezin amacı Türk siyasi yaşamında ordunun devleti koruyucu 
rolünün evrimini, 1960 ve 1980 askeri darbelerinin karşılaştırmalı analizi ile 
yapmaktır. Bu karşılaştırma bizim şu noktayı görmemizi sağlar: 1960 ve 1980 
askeri darbeleri " rasyonel dem.okrasi " olgusun siyasal yasam.a geri getirm.eyi 
amaçladığı halde, her müdahale demokrasi olgusuna farklı anlamlar yüklemiş, 
demokrasiyi kendi meşru zemini olarak kullanmıştır, ve daha önemlisi devlet 
iktidarını ve devlet özerkliğini kurmak için bir ” karar-alıcı " kurum işlevini 
görmüştür.
1960 ve 1980 askeri darbelerinin karşılaştırmalı çözümlemesinden 
üretilen bu tezin ana teması, ordunun bir karar-alma organı veya bir devlet 
seçkini olarak hareket ettiği zamanlarda, devleti koruma işlevini üstlendiğidir. 
Bu konuyu daha detaylı araştırmak için; askeri müdahalelerin örgütlendiği 
yollar ve siyasal yasamı yeniden kurma girişimleri incelenmiştir. Bu analiz 
içinde, 1961 ve 1982 Anayasaları karşılaştırılmış ve aralarındaki farklılıklara 
rağmen her iki darbenin ve yaşama geçirilen anayasaların devleti koruma ve 
devlet iktidarını ve özerkliğini pekiştirme amaçlarını üstlendiği ortaya 
konulmaya çalışılmıştır.
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INTRODUCTION
A. THE ROLE OF THE TURKISH MILITARY IN TURKISH
POLITICS
Military predominance in public life has a long and strong 
tradition in Turkey. From the beginning of the existence of a modern 
army in the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Mahmud II up to the present, 
the Turkish army has several times intervened directly in the political 
process: 1876, 1908, in the years of the struggle for independence after the 
First World War, 1960, 1971, and 1980. Moreover, during the entire 
period' except during the years 1950-1960- the army has participated 
substantially in political power: in the Ottoman Empire as part of the 
ruling class; during the Kemalist period as an important political force 
behind the scene (in spite of the formal separation of the army from 
politics); since 1961 as de jure ( National Security Council) and de facto 
(election of the President of the Republic from among the high ranking 
military) institutionalised part of the political executive power.
The Ottoman state had a heterogeneous and deeply divided 
society. During the foundation of the Empire, there were military lords 
with the ultimate function of achieving military co-operation. The rulers 
also had to face the external threat of powerful neighbours. Thus, an 
authoritarian system of rule with a military hierarchy was an inevitable 
outcome. One of the outstanding features of the Ottoman Empire was its 
strong military base. The highly organised military was in part recruited 
from fief holders who had no right to establish hereditary rights to their
lands. It was also in part recruited through the institution of 
"devşirme" : that is to say, from among the young sons of Balkan 
Christian subjects of the Empire. The famous Janissaries - the " New 
Troops" ' were boys carefully chosen, converted to Islam and well- 
trained. The Ottoman Empire had a strong and centralised state 
authority with a political centre composed of the sultan and his military? 
and civil bureaucrats. The most striking feature of the Ottoman Empire 
was this particular and virtual identity of state authority and military 
power.
In the 19th century, reform in education started in the 
army. The military were the substantial proportion of those Muslims who 
were trained in modern techniques. Faced by the reaction to change by 
conservatives in the army itself, as well as outside, the products of these 
new military schools began to see themselves as the vanguard of 
enlightenment, committed to political reforms, as well as technical 
innovation. These currents came to the surface in 1876 with the 
overthrowing of Sultan Abdùlaziz, and the subsequent introduction of 
Turkey's first constitution. The 1876 revolution was, in essence, a coup 
d'état and those who had launched it were to be regarded by their 20th 
century successors as an important source of inspiration, and historical 
legitimation for subsequent interventions.
According to William Hale, the Young Turk Revolution of 
1908 was, in some respects, a repeat performance of that of 1876.  ^ He 
points out that the disastrous experience of the Young Turks in political 
involvement (via a series of pronunciamentos and coups) led to the 
Ottomans' disastrous defeats in the Balkans of 1912-1913, the take-over
 ^ William Hale, "The Turkish Army in Politics, I960'1973", paper delivered at symposium, "Political 
Participation in the Turkish Republic", SOAS, Universit>^ of London, 16 May 1986.
of the Young Turks' group of Enver, Cemal and Talat, and the eventual 
collapse of the empire at the end of the Great War.
Following this set of disasters, Mustafa Kemal Paşa and his 
successors believed that the realisation of the twin goals of national 
security and modernisation was contingent upon the existence of order 
and tranquillity in the country and the existence of peace in the external 
world. They saw themselves as the guardians of the national good. 
Atatürk created a truly comprehensive organisation including both army 
personnel and civilians. Following his victory and the proclamation of 
the Republic, he took off his uniform (except for rare occasions of military 
ceremony) and insisted on strict separation of military and political 
affairs; he forced his associates, as well as opposition leaders, to choose 
once and forever between military and political careers. The principle of 
the exclusion of the military from open involvement in party politics was 
the basis of the law passed in December 1923, which obliged serving 
military officers who were elected to parliament to resign from the army 
before their election as deputies could be validated. It was reinforced by a 
section of the Military Penal Code ( Art. 148 ) which made it an offence 
for any soldier to join any political organisation, participate in 
demonstrations, or write or speak in public on political topics. The 
process was carried further in 1946 and in 1950, when the electoral law 
was altered so as to disenfranchise all officers, soldiers and cadets. For 
Atatürk, the function of the military-far from daily politics- should be the 
safeguarding of the nation from external enemies while the function of 
the political elites should be the elevation of the Turkish nation to the 
level of contemporary civilisation.
Flowever, Atatürk's removal of the army from politics was 
never quite complete. Military commanders sometimes continued the
Ottoman tradition of doubling up as provincial governors and military 
views almost certainty carried some weight in fields such as economic 
planning. The young officers were encouraged to think of themselves as 
the standard bearers of Ataturkism, and the ultimate guardians of its 
principles. In this way, Atatürk's political legacy to the Turkish army was 
that it should not be responsible for the day- to-day conduct of 
government; nevertheless, the officers saw themselves as continuing the 
revolutionary vanguard role which they had inherited from the late 
Ottoman period.
The death of Atatürk opened a new page to the evolution of 
the military's role. Although İnönü's presidency preserved Atatürk's 
principle that the army should remain loyal to the political civilian 
establishment, the radical political education that the military received 
had a crucial long-term effect.- The military considered themselves and 
took the responsibilities of being the foremost modernisers and ultimate 
guardians of the new regime- i.e. the multi-party system. The 
institutionalisation of the role of the military as a defender of the 
Republic against its internal and external enemies constituted a political 
dilemma: how could the military couple their tradition of political 
neutrality with their identification both with the republican state and 
with Atatürk's reforms?
As Metin Heper writes in his article " The State, the 
Military, and Democracy in Turkey " :
"... the military wished to see a political regime in Turkey 
that was a plural system of government but, at the same time, one in 
which such Republican norms as secularism, territoriabintegrative
^William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Milicary ( London: Routhledge, 1994 ), pp- 83.
nationalism, and populism would not be overlooked and the necessary 
measures for further modernising Turkey would be taken. Their support 
in the late 1940s for the Democrat Party, the opposition party against the 
RPP, which was in power for more than two decades and wdthin w'hich a 
dominant faction showed authoritarian tendencies toward the 
opposition; their opposition to the DP when they in turn resorted to 
harsh measures against the RPP; and their opposition to the entire party 
system in 1980, were instances in which they tried in their own way to 
promote democracy in Turkey. Their dissatisfaction with what to them 
were anti secularist policies of the Democrats, their opposition to the 
tolerance toward, if not encouragement of, radical ideologies of the leftist 
and rightist varieties during the 1960s and 1970s, and the swift action 
that they took each time, were instances in which they acted as guardians 
of the Republican norms, again as they interpreted those norms."^
B. MILITARY AND STATE TRADITION IN TURKEY:
The analysis of this master's thesis will focus upon the 
military interventions of 1960 and 1980 in Turkey. The understanding of 
a political phenomenon such as a coup d'etat necessitates the 
examination of the institution of the military through a historical 
perspective for identifying the paths of the evolution of its role within a 
certain society. So far, I have presented the transformation of the 
institutionalised role of the Turkish military in three elements. First, the 
Ottoman army had a complete identification with the state. Second, in 
the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the army showed themselves as the "
Metin Heper, "Tlie State, the Military, and Democracy in Turkey ", The Jerusalem Journal of 
International Relations, 9:3 ( September, 1987), pp. 55.
vanguard of a new enlightenment, based on the adoption of Western 
techniques and thought patterns."^ Third, in the Republican era the 
military was supposed to be apolitical and limited to the barracks; they 
could only intervene if the internal security and integration of the 
Turkish nation was in danger. The political dilemma of the army was the 
contradiction between the first and the third above mentioned points. 
The military interventions of 1960 and 1980 will be analysed in the 
context of this historical and contradictory evolution of the role of the 
military coupled with the special qualities, qualifications and beliefs of the 
military. I will try to analyse the trend towards authoritarianism in 
Turkey within specific time periods and the specific socio'cconomic and 
political conditions of the country, while not forgetting the influence of 
the historical background of the Turkish military.
The state tradition in Turkey has been always characterised 
by a centre'periphery cleavage and unfolding itself into " the state vs. 
political elites " cleavage since the Ottoman times. According to Metin 
Heper, the predominance of state over the civil society leads to a 
consensus legislated by the state elites and not as one evolving 
spontaneously out of the interaction among the political elites.^ Thus, the 
cleavages tend to be " cultural " and not " functional " ; and cultural 
cleavages are the more difficult type to resolve. Therefore, the 
consolidation of democracy was always fragile and the political system 
constituted a problematic issue.
From the very inception of the Ottoman polity the military 
had been either the dominant or an integral part of the state elites. 
Kemal Karpat, while examining the military and its relation to the state
William Hale, (1994) , pp. 2.
 ^ Mctin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, (Walkington, England: The Eothen Press, 1985).
and democracy, refers to the military's continuous historical association 
with, and its self-defined role as the guardian of the State. He points out 
that the military as a whole is the only major institution in Turkey to be 
able to claim an uninterrupted historical existence throughout centuries, 
despite a variety of changes in internal organisation, functional 
differentiation, professionalization, and specialisation. The reforms of the 
19th and 20th centuries strengthened and reassured its easy acceptance of 
change, innovation and technology; thus, they supposed to be the far 
more modernised and distinguished segment of the society.
The transition to multi-party politics opened the path for the 
confrontation between the state and political elites which in turn gave 
rise to new cleavages and animosities; this was marked by the response of 
the state elites to the degeneration of the political system with a direct 
intervention in politics three times. The conflicts engendered by the rise 
of a pluralistic social, economic and political order and the new set of 
relations this order necessitated between the military and the civilians 
unfolded the major issue of who would have priority in the making of key 
decisions concerning all the state affairs in Turkey. Therefore, the 
military interventions in Turkey cannot be explained solely by the 
internal dynamics of the military; it is important to examine also the 
dynamics of the political system of the country in the relevant periods of 
time.
The Turkish military have always been an elite group; that is 
to say, a highly educated and organised social group moving into the 
higher spectrums of the Turkish history. They have a high-esteem and 
prestige in the eyes of the people. They are the defenders of the nation 
from external enemies, full of altruism and ready to sacrifice themselves 
for the protection of the Republic. They were the modernising force of
8the emerging Turkey and the first institution to be elevated to the 
standards of Western civilisations. Their professionalism was 
accompanied by feelings of honour as well as discipline and uniformity 
emerging from the hierarchical basis of the institution. The organisation 
and coherence of the armed forces, coupled with its historical continuity, 
was further stressed by the self- image of the military as saviours rather 
than as the " corrupted and malfunctioning " politicians. In order not to 
loose their prestige in the eyes of the public, which may begin to view 
them as politicians and not as saviours, the military stayed for a short 
period of time in the political scene.
In each intervention of the military into politics since 1960, 
their foremost concern has been that of restructuring the political system 
so that further interventions would not be necessary in the future. They 
came as guardians of the Republic and attacked not the political system 
in itself but the degeneration, polarisation and political unrest created by 
the bad politicians. Those who carried the subsequent interventions tried 
to avoid and correct the perceived mistakes of the past. Thus, they came 
only for a short period of time in order to replace " a malfunctioning 
democracy ".
Having discussed the historical legacies which appear to have 
influenced and " sculptured " the political role of the Turkish army into 
the specific state tradition of Turkey, I have tried to present its potential 
importance in the political scene. By analysing the military interventions 
of 1960 and 1980 I will try to answer one crucial question: whether the 
military act as guardians or decision-makers. In trying this, I will present 
a theoretical basis for military interventions and I will show the 
exceptionality of the Turkish military in the context of the developing 
nations.
C. A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTIONS:
Military intervention as a political phenomenon has been a 
matter of concern and study for many political scientists. The wave of 
military interventions in the 1960s in the developing nations provided 
political scientists a new area of research concerning the relationship 
between politics, society and the military. Different scholars working on 
different regions advanced theses locating the causes for military political 
intervention variously in the nature of the military and in the nature of 
society. Major attention was devoted to the role of the military in the 
politics of those countries and explanations offered as to why that role 
was so prominent compared to the prevailing pattern in the developed 
Western societies and in communist societies.
The theoretical basis of this master's thesis will be the works 
of such influential scholars as S.E.Finer (1962), S.Huntington (1962,1968), 
M.Janowitz (1971), J.Johnson (1962), E. Nordlinger (1977), G.O'Donnell 
(1973), and others. Within that broader theoretical context I will combine 
the works of some well'known students of Turkish politics such as 
E.Ozbudun, M.Heper, A.Evin, F.Tachau, K.Karpat, W.Weiker, D.Lerner 
and R.Robinson, W.Hale, G.Harris and C.Dodd.
As 1 have earlier pointed out military intervention is not a 
political phenomenon related only to the internal dynamics of the 
institution of the military; it is rather a combination of the role of the 
military with the functioning of the political system. The Turkish case 
consists an important area of research both because a military 
intervention reconfirms the fragility and difficulty of consolidating 
democracy in a developing nation and because the conditions that
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opened the path for the Turkish coup d'état were different from those of 
other Third World countries.
Why does the military intervene into politics? According to 
S.E.Finer: " the armed forces have three massive political advantages over 
civihan organisations: a marked superiority in organisation, a highly 
emotionahsed symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms."^ Modern armies 
are cohesive and hierarchical. The army is a purposive instrument with 
such features as centralised command, hierarchy, discipline, 
intercommunication, esprit de corps and a corresponding isolation and 
self-sufficiency. The army also enjoys a politically important moral 
prestige as they carry traits like courage, discipline, self-sacrifice and 
patriotism. The military is not only the most highly organised association 
in the state; they also enjoy a monopoly of all effective weapons. 
However, the political weaknesses of the military are the main causes for 
their inability to rule for long periods of time. These are the technical 
inadequacy of the military and their lack of a moral title to rule.
What are the possible motives inhibiting the military from 
intervention? For S.Huntington the greater the professionalism, the more 
immersed does the officer become in his own technical tasks, and the less 
involved in politics.7 However, the level of professionalism is not an 
adequate factor for explaining the Turkish military interventions. 
According to E.Ozbudun, the Turkish coup of 1960 suggests that even a 
highly professionalized army may find itself in a situation which rriakes 
military intervention almost inescapable.^
^  S.E.Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, (London, England; Pinter 
Publishers, 1988).
‘ S.P.Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The llieory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations, 
(New York: Random House Vntage Book Edition, 1964 ).
 ^ E.Qzbudun, TTie Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics (Harvard Universit^^ Centre for 
International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs #14, November 1966) pp. 8.
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For S.E.Finer, the firm acceptance of civilian supremacy , 
not just professionalism, is the truly effective ch eck .T h is factor again 
does not constitute a sufficient explanation for the Turkish case. 
E.Ozbudun points out that: "... despite an historical and cultural 
background which usually encourages military rule, the tradition of a 
neutral army and civilian supremacy had firmly taken root in Turkey, as 
evidenced by almost four decades of unbroken civilian rule....Civilian 
supremacy was clearly established and never challenged. The military 
played a relatively minor and steadily decreasing role in the 
determination of pubUc poHcy."^^
According to S.E.Finer certain situations make the civil 
power abnormally dependent on the military .The government may rely 
on the military either on the grounds of external circumstances (foreign 
policy, threat of war), or on the grounds of domestic circumstances 
(situation of overt or acute crisis; situations of latent or chronic crisis; and 
power- vacuum situations).^^
Another hypothesis presented by Finer is that the frequency 
of military interventions is also determined by the nature of political 
culture. There are four types of political culture. In the " mature poHtical 
culture " legitimacy is paramount and unobtainable by the military. 
Here, the level of military intervention is influence: that is to say, a 
constitutional and legitimate, one entirely consistent with the supremacy 
of the civil power. " The miUtary authorities act in precisely the same 
way and with the same authority as any elements in the bureaucracy.
“ S.E.Finer, (1988), pp. 26. 
'^E.Ozbudun, (1966), pp. 8. 
"  S.E.Finer, (1988), pp. 66.
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though their influence may well be weightier and on occasion overriding, 
in view of the greater risks involved by the rejection of their advice."
In countries with " developed political culture " legitimacy 
is important and resistive to military. The level of intervention is either 
influence or blackmail. Blackmail refers to the effort of the military to 
convince the civilian power by the threat of some sanction. It can range 
from collusion or competition with the civilian authorities to the 
intimidation of the civilian authorities or to threats of non-co-operation 
with or violence towards the civilian authorities.^^
" Low political culture " involves a legitimacy of some 
importance, but which is fluid. The level of intervention is blackmail, 
displacement of the civilian government or supplantment of the civilian 
regime. The methods at these levels are threats of non-co-operation or 
violence towards the civilian government, failure to defend the civilian 
authorities against violence, or the exercise of violence against the civilian 
authorities. S.E.Finer places Turkey in the set of countries with low 
political culture.
In countries with " minimal political culture " legitimacy is 
unimportant. The military intervenes either by displacement of the 
civilian governments or by supplantment of the civilian regime. In these 
countries the military is the sole political force; and as such it is entirely 
at large.
Whether military interventions are determined by the nature 
of the political culture or whether Turkey can be classified in the group of 
countries with low political culture, Turkey's exceptionality does not
Ibid., pp. 77 and 126. 
'M bid.,pp. 12^127.
Ibid.,pp. 12i^l27and 99. 
>Mbid.,pp. 126, 118.
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change. According to E.Ozbudun: " ... the First Turkish Republic, 
having achieved a balance between a relatively high degree of political 
institutionalisation and a moderate rate of social mobilisation, did not 
face the well-known problems of many modernising systems. More 
specifically, Turkish political parties are among the best organised in the 
underdeveloped world, with highly centralised, disciplined, and cohesive 
organisations penetrating approximately three-fifths of the Turkish 
villages... It is clear that the Turkish Army, unhke the armies in many 
other developing countries, did not move into a power-vacuum which 
might have been created by the multiplicity, fluidity, and incoherence of 
political groups."
Another factor determining the level of political 
institutionalisation is S.Huntington's notion of " adaptability" . 
Adaptability " is a function of environmental challenge and change. The 
more challenges which have arisen in its environment and the greater its 
age, the more adaptable it is."^  ^ Turkish political parties, RPP and DP, 
appear to be highly institutionalised.^® Therefore, the military 
interventions in Turkey cannot be explained solely from the perspective 
of political institutionalisation. The exceptionality of Turkey within the 
set of developing nations emerges once more. Military interventions in 
Turkey will be analysed as a combination of various factors, shortly 
presented in the above pages, under the domination of a highly 
patrimonial state tradition which unfolded itself during the years of the 
multi-party period as " the state vs. the political elites
E.Ozbudun, (1966), pp. 6.
S.Huntington, ” Political Development and Political Decay ”, World Politics, vol. XVII ( April, 
196.5), pp. 394099.
E.Ozbudun, (1966) , pp. 6. 
i^M.Heper, (1985).
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Some additional remarks for the concepts of military 
professionalism, national interest and civilian supremacy will be 
enlightening for the comprehension and analysis of the Turkish military 
intervention into politics. As I have pointed out earlier, the political 
weaknesses of the military are their technical inability to administer and 
their lack of moral title to rule. These two conditions constitute the 
barriers to military intervention in politics and the military are expected 
to recognise their lack of competence as well as the lack of moral right to 
rule. According to Frank Tachau, this assumption may not be fulfilled if 
the members of the military are not appropriately socialised into their 
roles as technical experts subject to civilian authority. Such socialisation, 
in turn, may be lacking if insufficient time has elapsed since the 
establishment of the state for respect for civilian rulers to be internalised, 
or for the civilians to prove their competence sufficiently to establish a 
credible moral title to their own. In other words, new states such as most 
of those of the Third World, are less likely to have a proper opportunity 
to develop strong traditions of civilian supremacy over the m ilitary .T h e 
Turkish case of the military had the exceptional feature of a neutral army 
under the civil supremacy of the Ataturk's Republic. Despite that fact, 
the military did not hesitate to intervene in 1960. Why?
Tachau argues that it would also be risky to assume that 
military intervention occurs when the highest interests of the state and 
society require or justify such action. It is entirely possible that the 
military, like other corporate elite groups in the civilian sector, may be 
moved to action by strictly parochial interests.A lthough it is difficult to
Frank Tachau, " The Turkish Milicary: Guardians of Democracy ? " , paper prepared for the Xllth 
IPSA Congress, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, August 9T4, 1982, pp. 2.
Ibid., pp. 3.
determine whether or not this is the case, for the military tend to publicly 
justify their action in terms of the national interests of the country, 1 
would try to explain the military interventions of 1960 and 1980 in this 
perspective, as the nature of their function and training is identified with 
Atatürk's principles and such goals as the protection of the Republic. As 
F.Tachau points out ; "... civilian regimes overthrown by such coups 
almost invariably manifest weaknesses and lack of competence which 
serve to justify military action against them, particularly if there is no 
other political alternative." Does the Turkish experience fit into this 
line of thinking?
Eric Nordlinger believes that no matter how deeply ingrained 
the respect for the principle of civil supremacy among the military, it is 
likely to be overcome if the civilian authorities intervene in the 
professional concerns of the military and appear to be hampering their 
ability to fulfil their prime function, which requires them to maintain 
their autonomy, professionalism and cohesiveness.O ne of the reasons 
for the 1960 military intervention could be the harsh measures taken by 
the Democratic government towards the military which substantially 
diminished their previous superiority.
Eric Nordlinger, in his book Soldiers in Politics: Military 
Coups and Government, has suggested a typology encompassing three 
models or patterns of political involvement of the military:
1. T h e military act as " moderators " . In this model, the military do 
not overtly seize the reigns of government, but rather exercise " veto 
power " from behind the scenes. Only if the civilians fail to comply with
Ibid., pp. 3.
E.Nordlinger, Soldiers in Polidcs: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
PrendcC'Hall, 1977).
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the desires of the military do they execute a " displacement coup " 
designed to bring a more reliable civilian group to power. The goals of 
the military in this model are : "... to preserve the status quo, maintaining 
the balance (or imbalance) of power among the contending groups, 
enforcing the political and constitutional ground rules, staving off 
practically any kind of important change in the distribution of economic 
rewards, and ensuring political order and governmental stability."^^ The 
1971 military intervention can be classified into this category.
2. T he Guardian Regime. Military guardians are essentially similar to 
moderators except that they feel it necessary to displace the civilian 
government, that is, to overtly assume the power of government. Their 
goals are as conservative as those of the moderators. "...Their goals may 
include the removal of squabbling, corrupt, and excessively partisan 
politicians, the revamping of the governmental and bureaucratic 
machinery to make for greater efficiency, and the redistribution of some 
power and economic rewards among civilian groups...Basically, they 
intend to correct what are seen to be the malpractices and deficiencies of 
the previous government. They are " iron surgeons " ready to make some 
incisions into the body politics, but doing little to replace what has been 
cut out or even to ensure that the surgical operation has lasting 
consequences after the praetorians discharge the patient The 1960 
military intervention was a " guardian regime ".
3. T he ruler type. Far from wishing to maintain status quo, this type of 
regime has as its goal not only control but often basic changes in 
significant aspects of the political, economic and even social system. 
Repression is generally more extensive. The polity, society, and economy
Ibid., pp. 22.23. 
Ibid., pp. 25.
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are to be penetrated from a b o v e . T h e  Kemalist regime has some 
important features fitting into this type.
Although virtually all military regimes promise to retire from 
power once their goals are achieved, the moderators and guardians are 
more likely to fulfil that promise relatively quickly, in accordance with 
their more conservative and modest goals. The ruler types, however, are 
likely to stay in place for a much more extended period of time, perhaps,
indefinitely.27
Tachau argues that the propensity for the military to become 
politically active varies over time. In this sense, the first act of 
intervention is generally the most significant. It breaks the precedent of 
nonintervention. The threshold of civilian supremacy and military non­
intervention has been either destroyed or at least rendered less effective 
than it once w a s .28
Another influential contribution to the subject matter of 
military interventions have been made by the Argentine political scientist 
Guillermo O'Donnell in 1973. O'Donnell, motivated by the wave of 
military interventions in the Southern Cone of Latin America 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay), introduced the concept of 
" bureaucratic-authoritarianism ".29 He observed that the military 
interventions of the 1960s in these countries- especially the cases of Brazil 
in 1964 and Argentina in 1966- were qualitatively different from earlier 
ones in two aspects. First, they had come to stay for a much longer period 
of time, or indefinitely. Second, they were to perform much more
Ibid., pp. 26"27·
Frank Tachau, (1982 ), pp. 5. 
Ibid., pp. 5.
“ Guillermo O' Donnell, Modernisarion and Bureaucraric-Aud^oritarianism (Berkeley, Universirv^ of 
California: Institute of International Studies, 1973).
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profound changes in society, coupled with a higher degree violence than 
ever. What were the causes of the bureaucratic-authoritarianism?
O'Donnell offered an economic explanation. In the 1930s the 
populist coalitions of these countries concentrated their economic policies 
and developmental programmes on " Import-Substitution based 
Industrialisation " (ISI). These coalitions seemed to be successful in Brazil 
and Argentina as high levels of industrialisation were achieved, with a 
consequence of high profits for both the industrialists and the urban 
working class. However, an eventual economic stagnation is inherent in 
import-substitution industrialisation. After the exhaustion of the easy 
stage of ISI, a crisis situation was evident in those countries. Rising 
inflation and balance-of-payment difficulties undermined the economic 
gains made by the urban middle and working classes and hence eroded 
the viability of the populist coalitions on which these regimes were based. 
Attributing the crisis to the threat of political activation within the 
popular sectors (which continued to press for improvements in their 
living standards), technocrats in both Argentina and Brazil encouraged 
and supported military coups. The new regimes, rather than attempting 
to reincorporate the popular sectors, moved to exclude and deactivate 
them by instituting a repressive brand of authoritarianism and to reorient 
the political economy according to technocratic conceptions of economic 
growth. These conceptions included a deepening of industrialisation 
through the domestic manufacture of consumer durables and 
intermediate and capital goods, which required larger, more efficient, and 
highly capitalised enterprises- often the affiliates of multinational 
corporations.
To some extent, Turkey shows some resemblance to Latin 
America. Import-Substitution Industrialisation was a policy activated in
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1950s and earlier. This economic policy was not for the 
internationalisation of the market, but for high protection through such 
measures as; quotas for imports; state control; and, investment incentives. 
The concentration on production for the domestic market gave to 
populists governments the support of the industrialists and the urban 
poor. The oil shock in 1970s, however, caused a foreign exchange crisis in 
Turkey. The end of the ISl and the populist coalitions was obvious. The 
necessary move was a trend towards internationalisation and an export- 
led market. This move was made by the military government of 12 
September 1980. Thus, the military came with rather different economic 
policies; it intended to stay for a longer period of time (shorter compared 
to Latin America); it introduced fundamental changes coupled with the 
use of violence.
Can we attribute the connotation of " bureaucratic- 
authoritarianism " to the Turkish military coup d'état? This will be dealt 
with extensively in the following pages.
Following almost the same line of thinking, a reference 
should also be made to the work of Morris Janowitz. In his book The 
Military in the Political Development of New Nations, Janowitz puts 
emphasis to the internal organisation of the military of the " new nations 
" as an important factor for the explanation of civil-military relations. He 
points out that the capacity of the military to intervene into politics 
derives from its control of the instruments of violence; its identification 
with the national interest and public interest; and its skill structure, 
which combines managerial ability with a heroic posture.
Morris JanowiD, The Military in the Political Development of New Narions: An Essay in 
Comparadve Analysis (Chicago and London: The University of Chiaigo Press, 1964), pp. 27-28.
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The skill structure and career lines of the military put some 
limitations in their ability to bargain and politically communicate, which 
are required in order to sustain political leadership. Additionally, the 
social recruitment and education of the military, based on middle and 
lower-middle classes of rural areas or hinterlands, and an educational 
background based on an innovating outlook towards modernisation, 
contributes to a military profession with no strong allegiance to an 
integrated upper class which it accepts as its political leader , and it 
certainty refuses a pervasive conservative outlook.^'
The military of the new nations have a strong sense of 
nationalism, a puritanical outlook, an acceptance of extensive 
government control of social and economic change, and a deep distrust of 
organised civilian politics. The take-over of power by the military in new 
nations has generally followed the collapse of efforts to create democratic- 
type institutions. If the military is to succeed in its political goal, it must 
develop a political apparatus outside of the military establishment but 
under its direct dominat ion. I s  the Turkish case in accordance to these 
conditions mentioned by Janowitz?
In the following pages, I will concentrate on the analysis of 
each military intervention in a respective chapter. Chapter One deals 
with the analysis of the background and the period of the 1960 militar^  ^
intervention. Chapter Two concentrates on the examination of the 
conditions for the 12 September 1980 military regime and the policies 
followed by the establishment of the military as a political leader. The 
concluding chapter of this dissertation is a comparative analysis of the 
two military regimes.
Ibid., pp. 28. 
Ibid., pp. 28-29.
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With the help of a historical and theoretical perspective, I 
will try to answer the question of why military interventions took place in 
Turkey and to what extent they constitute an abnormality or a rule for 
the Turkish political system. I will examine the military take'Overs from a 
critical perspective and special references to the origins of the fragility of 
Turkish democracy, which is too closely bound to the " tradition " of an 
intra-elite conflict. The internal dynamics of the military, the functioning 
of the Turkish political system and the specific socio-economic conditions 
of the country in each specific period of this study are going to be the 
driving forces to an effort to find an answer to a question full of political 
concern for each democratic society: " The military as guardians or 
decision-makers? ".
I l
CHAPTER ONE
THE 1960 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN TURKEY
The military intervention of May 27, 1960 is an important 
point in Turkish political history for two crucial reasons. First, it is an 
open expression of the fragility of the democratic system in the Turkish 
Republic and a demonstration of the difficulty of consolidating 
democracy in a newly modernising nation. Second, it is the 
transformation of the political dilemma of the military's getting involved 
in action, because of the clash between the roles of the military as both a 
neutral army, not committed to daily politics ( an Atatürk's legacy of the 
Republic ), and a guardian army of the nation and the integrity and 
security of the Republic ( an Ottoman legacy, with its origins in the 
identification of the military with the state ). Military intervention was 
probably an inevitable outcome, as democracy had not been 
strengthened in such a short period of time, and the military had been 
perceiving itself as the only institution in the society with the ultimate 
qualification of modernisation and rationality.
A. THE BACKGROUND OF THE MILITARY INTERVENTION
a) MultLparty period ( 1946-1960 );
After the death of M .K.Atatürk, İsmet İnönü became the 
President of the Republic. Turkey's entry into the Western world 
following the war was paralleled by new and more liberal political, 
economic, and social attitudes and policies in the country. İnönü was a 
partisan of liberal policies vis-à-vis the authoritarian sectors of the party 
which envisaged a long period of continued single-party tutelage. İnönü
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gave encouragement to the growing group of young party leaders who 
were fully committed to modernisation, skilled in the techniques of 
democratic, secular politics, and increasingly impatient with the 
structures of single-party d i s c i p l i n e . I n  1946, almost as soon as the 
international situation allowed a return to normal politics, opposition 
parties were permitted.
According to Kemal Karpat, there were some conditions for 
allowing the establishment of opposition parties in 1945-1946. President 
İnönü had told Celal Bayar, the leader of the proposed new party 
(Democrat Party), that his group would be free to debate and challenge 
any of the principles of the ruling party except the Kemalists tenets of 
republicanism and secularism.
The opposition to the autocratic rule of the RPP came even 
within the party itself. Despite the liberal measures taken by the RPP, 
there were those who believed that further démocratisation and 
liberalisation was essential for the incorporation of Turkey in the 
Western advanced nations. Thus, four distinguished members of the RPP- 
Celal Bayar, Fuat Köprülü, Adnan Menderes and Refik Koraltan- left the 
RPP and formed the D em ocrat Party  on January 7, 1946.
The political philosophy of the DP was generally liberal and 
the basis of its strength was the large portion of the nation either 
neglected by or dissenting from the policies of the RPP. Hale points out 
that: "... they were generally liberal in their political inclinations, but in 
practice drew together the large and diverse range of people who, for one
\X a^lter F. Wciker, The Turkish Revolurion 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics ( Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1963), pp. 6.
Kemal Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army^Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 
1980", in The State, Democracy and the Military :^ Turkey in the 1980s, Metin Heper and Ahmet 
Evin (eds.), (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 137G 38.
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reason or another, had come to resent the R PP 's long monopoly of 
power- farmers who felt neglected by the regime's concentration on 
industrialisation, businessmen who hoped to end the dominant role of 
the state in industry, urban workers and clerks who had suffered severely 
from wartime inflation, and some religious conservatives who wished to 
soften the official emphasis on secularism. " 5^
While the DP concentrated its programme on such issues as 
opposition to etatism, restrictions on civil liberties which have been 
imposed during the single-party period and accented during World War 
II, and on corruption of the government, the RPP was countered with the 
accusation that the DP was betraying secularism by permitting 
" reactionaries " to "...usurp the freedom that was meant only for those 
honestly differing in the view how to perpetuate the revolution."
Turkey experienced its first real election campaign in 1946, 
and there was great popular enthusiasm and participation. Although the 
DP had strong popular support, the Democrats lacked time to develop a 
systematic program of their own beyond simply promising to do better. 
General elections were supposed to be held in 1947, but the date was 
brought earlier to July 1946, probably to prevent the DP building up their 
grass-roots organisation in time.-^  ^ The first elections in Turkey using a 
direct voting, rather than an indirect system, via an electoral college, 
were accused to be held with fraud in some occasions. The RPP won the 
elections with 395 seats in the Grand National Assembly compared with 
only 64 for the Democrats and 6 for independent candidates.^®
”  W. Hale, (1994), pp. 89.
Walter Weiker, ( 1963 ), pp. 8.
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Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey 
( London, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University' Press, 1977), pp. 403.
25
In the summer and fall of 1946, it became obvious that 
within the ranks of the DP there was considerable difference of opinion 
regarding how to proceed. After a period of ideological ferment and 
argument (called the " spirit of 1946 " ), the party leaders ousted a group 
of Islamist-populist militants who were advocating open warfare against 
the military-civilian bureaucratic coalition and against the secularist-elitist 
ideology. The ousted members accused Bayar and Menderes of being 
basically the same in spirit and mentality as the group they appeared to 
be fighting against.^9
The elections of 1950 offered an astonishing victory for the 
Democrats and put an end to the 25 years of rule of the RPP. After the 
DP came to power, a constantly growing polarisation between the two 
parties emerged. The animosity between the government and the 
opposition was around the issues of secularism and the maintenance of 
political freedoms.
The government of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes 
promised rapid economic growth. This was achieved by relaxation of the 
tight controls of the etatist policies and by encouragement of private 
enterprises. In the short run the results were successful. Economy was 
growing rapidly with an increase in bank credits, investment in all sectors 
of the economy, production both in the agricultural and industrial sector, 
and an incredible improvement in infrastructure. The rate of population 
growth was doubled ; there was an increase in the gross national product 
and the per capita income. However, the impressive statistics were just 
one side of the coin.
39 Kemal Karpat, ( 1988 ), pp. 138.
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The tremendous economic expansion was accompanied by 
such factors that played a fundamental role in the future undermining of 
the regime. The government budget fell into debt and the balance of 
foreign trade turned to deficit. The public debt tripled while the 
increasing per capita income affected only some segments of the 
population. Rising inflation, increasing exports coupled with increasing 
imports were some of the side effects of an expanding economy which 
were not prevented by the government of the DP; thus, the long-term 
prospects of a bright economic expansion had not been secured and the 
growing economic discontent was to be met with political repression. 
This was going to be the beginning of the end as the government was 
violating one of the basic tenets of its political success. The paradox was 
that, while before coming to power they were accusing the autocratic 
character of the RPP rule, once in power they followed almost the same 
line of governing.
The second major problematic area was that of religion, 
where the government was accused of trying to reverse the Kemalist 
secular policies. In 1949, the RPP, as part of its liberalisation efforts, had 
allowed religious instruction to be provided to those students in the 
public schools whose parents requested it. As the Democrats had been 
elected from a conservative platform by giving promises of increased 
religious instruction, the Menderes regime soon extended it to all schools 
and required all Muslim children to receive it unless their parents 
specifically requested exemption. The government expanded the number 
of institutions for training im am s; in 1950 they abolished the 1928 law 
prohibiting the use of the Arabic call to prayer; Ramazan began to be 
celebrated more publicly; religious publications reappeared; the remnants 
of various mystic sects began to show their heads, although the activities
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of the more troublesome sects like the Nurs were severely dealt with in 
1950'I960; large amount of the government funds were used for building 
new mosques in cities, towns and villages.^^
According to Walter Weiker, "...there will be arguments in 
Turkey for many years about whether the Democratic party period was 
one of the betrayal of secularism, the exploitation of religion, the 
restoration of freedom of worship, or the beginning of a new period of 
" modernised Islam ". The pertinent fact is that the Democrats and the 
RPP made the interpretation of secularism an ever-growing issue. It 
dovetailed with other issues and served to add fuel to a fire which will 
continue to smolder."^^
The third major problem, which had a catalytic effect in the 
fall of the Menderes regime, was the issue of political freedom. Actually, 
both of the two parties did not know how to respond to opposition. After 
the election victory of the DP in 1950, the government became extremely 
sensitive to criticisms coming from the opposition, especially on the issues 
of its economic and religious policies. The universities were a major 
problematic area for the DP. The University Law of 1946 - low salaries for 
junior faculty members, pensions poorer compared to salaries, few 
opportunities for promotion- led the unhappy and poorly paid 
academicians to go beyond their right to participate as citizens and to 
become highly politicised within their classrooms; particularly, the 
faculties of law and political science became the centres of opposition 
politics.
^  Walter Weiker, (1963 ), pp. 9, and S.J.Shaw and E.K.Shaw,( 1977 ), pp. 409. 
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The DP government was aware of the effectiveness of the 
criticisms coming from the intellectuals and their ability to have access to 
mass media and influence public opinion, especially in such a critical 
period of time of preparation for the 1954 elections. Therefore, from 1953 
on, a series of repressive laws was placed against not only the 
universities, but also the press, the RPP, and the other opposition parties. 
None of these laws were overtly against freedom for these sources of 
criticism. Most of them were framed in a way that could be rationalised 
within the framework of the Atatürk revolution.
In 1953 the Nation Party was banned on the grounds that it 
was using religion to subvert the Republic. Charges were brought against 
the leaders of many branches who were accused as reactionary elements 
hostile to the reforms of Atatürk. The properties of the RPP were 
confiscated and the party newspaper. Ulus, was forced to suspend 
publication. The University Law was amended to further restricting the 
universities' control of their own budgets and, thereby, of their 
educational and personnel polides.'^^
After the victory in the elections of 1954, the DP government 
went further in its repression policies. In 1954, all government officials 
and employees, including university professors and judges, were made 
subject to retirement after 25 years of government service or became 60 
years of age. The same government employees also now could be 
dismissed or retired by the authorities who employed them, without 
statement of reason or appeal, and on pensions ranging from one-half to 
one-fourth of their salaries according to length of service. In addition, 
university teachers were ordered to limit their activities " to scientific.
Walter Weiker, ( 1963 ), pp.lO.
Shaw and Shaw, (1977 ), pp. 410.
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educational writing " and to avoid using their positions for " active 
partisan politics
From 1954 to 1957 the Democrat government continued its 
efforts for suppression of the opposition in whatever form possible. In 
1954 four judges and seventeen professors were retired; while three 
newspapermen had been jailed and four others dismissed for similar 
reasons. In 1955 the RPP general secretary, Kasim Gulek, was jailed for 
insulting the government in a political speech. Five newspapers were 
suspended, including U lus once, again, for violating censorship regulation 
about the Cyprus issue. Universities became active centres of opposition 
politics, and the government replied with suspensions, restrictions, and 
imprisonments. The year 1956 was the same. A press law passed again 
and newsmen jailed for " damaging public confidence in or the prestige 
of the government " . Political meetings were prohibited except during a 
forty'five day period before the general election. The same prohibition 
was applied to any type of electioneering, and the police were given 
authority to fire on crowds at " unlawful political gatherings
An important element for the victory of the DP in the 
elections of 1957 was a law previously passed. The government used the 
increased multiplicity of opposition parties ( Peasant's Party-1953, 
Freedom Party-1955 ) for its own advantage by passing a new Election 
Law that prohibited party coalitions; thus, preventing a united front 
against it."·' The fact that the party, winning a plurality of votes in each 
district, was able to get all of the deputies, even when it did not secure a 
majority, was an additional factor for the electoral victory of the DP. The
^Ubid.,pp. 411.
Walter Welker, ( 1963 ), pp- 11.
"*4bid., pp. 11,- Shaw and Shaw,( 1977 ), pp. 412.
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victorious results of the 1957 elections for the DP showed clearly that 
while the intellectuals and civil servants with relatively fixed incomes 
were antagonised by the inflation and shortages, thus opposing the DP; 
the masses were enjoying much higher standards of living than before, 
and they appreciated it.
The election results only contributed to further political 
turmoil between the government and the opposition. In 1957 the 
Democrats introduced restrictions on the Assembly itself, "... limiting 
the number and scope of questions deputies could ask of ministers, 
tightening the regulations for parliamentary immunity, and forbidding 
the press from reporting on subjects of an offensive nature even if these 
were debated publicly in the Assembly. "4^
In May 1959 İnönü was attacked by a pro-Democratic mob 
while travelling in the countryside and again on his return to Istanbul. 
The economic situation was also worsened by the government's 
insistence on continued industrialisation and rapid capital improvement 
which added to inflation and brought the nation to the brink of 
international bankruptcy.
In 1960 in return for loans from an international consortium, 
the government was forced to accept an economic-stabilisation program 
to reduce inflation and restore monetary order. With the help of the IMF 
a new program was worked out. It involved severe restrictions on deficit 
financing and credit expansion, devaluation of the Turkish lira, 
consolidation of the public debt, an end to price controls, and a more 
rational program of the internal investment.^^ Inflation was reduced, the
Ibid., pp. 11.
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budget and foreign trade again were in surplus, and the crisis seemed to 
be over.
b) The End of the Menderes Regime and the Army;
The period until the May 27, 1960 military intervention was 
full of political violence, an increased criticism of the government coming 
from the opposition and a dangerously growing animosity between them. 
All political activity was prohibited and an Investigation Committee in 
the TGN A, composed of the most partisan Democratic representatives, 
was appointed. The Committee was given the right to imprison any 
citizens, close any newspapers, or suspend any law that interfered with its 
work.
These measures of the government opened the path for an 
open revolt. Violent demonstrations in the cities and the universities 
were a daily event; but, the government was able to keep order both 
because it controlled the police and the army and retained majority 
support outside Istanbul and Ankara. The universities were closed on 
April 29, 1960; most newspapers were suspended; and, foreign periodicals 
reporting on the situation were refused entry into the country.50
The declaration of Martial Law on April 29 in Istanbul and 
Ankara was the starting point for the scepticism of the military for the 
overall picture of the country. The May 21 incident of the protest march 
of 1,000 officers and cadets from the Ankara Military College to the 
Presidential mansion in Çankaya was an open refusal of the arbitrary 
arrest of several officers.
The application for leave of Cemal Gürsel- the Gommander 
of the Land Forces -, pending his retirement under the age limit of 65,
50 Ibid., pp. 413.
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was initially refused and then accepted on May 3. Gürsel left with a 
farewell message to all units in the army, urging them not to allow the 
forces to be used to further the ambitions of politicians. He also wrote 
another letter to Ethem Menderes, the Defence Minister, suggesting that 
both Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar should resign and the 
Investigation Committee be wound up.^l
Before examining the military regime of 1960-1961, it should 
be useful to look at the relationship of the DP and the army. The DP's 
actions vis-a-vis the military during its ten years of power are not 
sufficient in themselves to have provoked the 1960 intervention. After 
Turkey entered the NATO alliance in 1952, the DP tried to respond to 
the military's important basic demands by rejuvenating the upper 
echelons of the army and modernising its weapons and training systems.
There was a close connection of the army with the single­
party regime and the RPP, and thus an antipathy to the Democrats. The 
DP had attacked the RPP which was represented by the bureaucracy and 
the military since Atatürk. Thus, the army was put away of its central 
role in the Turkish political culture, while emphasis was put on the 
individual citizen- businessmen, independent professionals and the better- 
off peasants. This conception of loosing status and pride was further 
reinforced by the high cost of living and high levels of inflation which 
could not be afforded by their salaries.52
The stimulus for the 1960 military intervention was rather the 
malfunctioning of the party politics. According to K.Karpat , "... in the 
first place, it did not appear that the DP's relations with the military were 
so antagonistic as to engender support for a take-over. A variety of small,
5’ William Hale, ( 1994 ), pp. 107. 
52 Ibid., pp. 94-99.
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so-called secret, associations had existed within the military since 1954, 
but these were basically social organisations that were promoted as 
revolutionary societies after 1950, when anti-DP activities acquired an 
aura of heroism and patriotism. Furthermore, in view of the army's old 
tradition of political neutrality, which had been reinforced by Atatürk's 
firm opposition to military involvement in politics, it seemed unlikely 
that the army would choose to intervene
On May 27, as the agitation in the streets reached a new 
peak, a group of officers led by Gürsel, commanding the key military 
units in Istanbul and Ankara and using the students of the war 
academies, arrested Menderes, Bayar, and most other members of the 
cabinet along with many Democratic deputies. The remaining elements 
of the armed forces immediately declared their support. Martial law was 
imposed and the coup accepted throughout the country with very little 
opposition, even by those who continued to support the Menderes 
regime.
The 27 May revolution raised certain questions about the 
political legitimacy of the action of the military; the timing of the 
intervention; and the involvement of the RPP in the preparation of the 
coup.
The proclamations of the military after the coup claimed that 
they had inter\'ened " owing to the crisis into which our democracy has 
fallen, and owing to the recent sad incidents and in order to prevent 
fratricide ".^4 Some claimed against the military's proclamation that there 
was no civil war to be prevented, that the Menderes government was a 
legitimate one as it had won the elections of 1957, and that it had not
Kemal Karpat, ( 1988 ), pp.i41. 
54 W. Hale, ( 1994 ),pp. HO.
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broken the constitution. On the other hand, if the military had not 
intervened, the situation might have turned into a civil war. The military 
could have waited until the government had run a totally unfair election- 
much as the Philippine army did in 1986 when it toppled President 
Marcos. As the military had legitimised its action with the claim that the 
Menderes government had lost legitimacy, it could not stay for a long 
period of time in the political sc e n e .55
The second question relates to the fact whether A.Menderes 
expected the coup, and , if so, why he failed to do anything to prevent it. 
Evidence shows that the answer to the first question was a " yes ". 
Certainly, the Minister of Defence was aware of the anxiety within the 
army. Evidence also shows that the Prime Minister had taken the promise 
of the Chief of the General Staff- General Erdelhun- that the army would 
stay loyal to the government. Also, it is said that Menderes was 
prevented to resign before the coup by Celal B ayar.56
The third question is whether the RPP had any relationship 
with the army in the preparation of the coup. It is for sure that the 
supporters of the Democrat Party strongly believed that there was an 
involvement of ismet İnönü in order to destroy the DP. However, 
evidence from the biographies of İnönü show that he did not know 
anything prior to the coup. William Hale believes that even if İnönü had 
gained prior knowledge of the coup, it seems most unlikely that he would 
have warned Menderes in advance.57
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B. THE NATIONAL UNITY COMMITTEE PERIOD ( 1960-1961)
General Gürsel and 38 officers representing all branches of 
the armed forces organised themselves into the National Unity 
Committee ( NUC ), to govern the country, assuming legal powers under 
a provisional law ( June 12, 1960 ) that it promulgated soon afterward, 
though executive power remained in the hands of a civilian Council of 
Ministers, which it appointed and controlled. 8^
The regime established by the junta which carried out the 
1960 military intervention may be characterised as a guardian type in 
Nordlinger's terms, i.e., a regime which took control of the government 
for the purpose of preserving ( or re-establishing ) status quo. It may also 
be referred to as a " reformist " coup. In the words of E.Ozbudun: "... as 
is typical of reform coups, the revolutionary officers were " highly 
nationalistic, progressive, authoritarian, and developmental-minded." 
Although they did not " instigate a convulsive revolutionary process ", 
they did make some reforms in the political, economic, and social 
structure. The accomplishments of the NUC were certainly not confined 
to " cleaning up the government" and " cleaning up the streets
The N U C claimed that it had no intention of ruling beyond 
the time needed to try and punish those responsible for betraying Turkish 
democracy and to draw up a new constitution better able to protect the 
nation from abuses in the future. However, by the fall of 1960, several 
factions were formed within the NUC. The moderate group believed that 
power should be returned to civilians as soon as possible, so that social 
reforms were put into action. Some members of this group were believed
Shaw and Shaw, ( 1977 ), pp. 414.
E.Ozbudun, (1966 ), pp. 23, quoting Huntington, (1962 ), pp.32^34.
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to be in contact with the RPP.^o The radical wing of the N U C was 
holding strongly authoritarian and ultra-nationalist views. This minority 
group thought that the junta should stay in power long enough to bring 
about structural changes in the economy and politics. The majority, 
however, disagreed, and the 14 member officers were ousted and sent out 
of the country, mostly as military attachés to Turkish embassies around 
the world. Was that expulsion of the fourteen a first step for a smooth 
transition back to civilian government? Or was a necessary action for 
preventing a dangerous split within the military?
The N U C remained in power for little more than a year. It 
concentrated mainly on its objectives of trying the Democratic leaders 
and writing a new constitution, but it also inaugurated major policy 
changes in the areas of economics and finance in order to set the 
subsequent regime on a new course. First it acted to stem inflation. Most 
of the large infrastructure projects were stopped. Banks were temporarily 
closed , loans were suspended, and personal accounts of leading 
politicians and businessmen were frozen. Partial banking activity was 
allowed only after the interest rate on borrowing was raised to 12 percent 
to reduce the expansion of credit. The purchase of government bonds 
was made compulsory to wage earners to soak up demand. Price controls 
were introduced, causing food prices in particular to drop, causing 
pleasure to the townspeople and despair to the farmers. Land taxes were 
increased tenfold, building taxes two to six times. Income tax was 
doubled, while all those subject to it were required to declare their total 
assets, causing many to fear a new capital tax.
Ibid., pp. 33.
Shaw and Shaw , ( 1977 ) pp. 415.
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The establishment of the State Planning Organisation was 
one of the most important reforms introduced by the NUC. This 
institution was incorporated into the 1961 Constitution. The 
organisation had a mbced character of being political and highly 
technocratic at the same time. As E. Ozbudun writes; "... while the 
planners were given a relatively free hand within broadly defined 
economic goals during the NUC rule, they began to have an increasingly 
difficult time under the civilian governments. It may be assumed that 
many c iv ilian pohticians resented what they considered to be an 
encroachment upon their authority by a group of technocrats. Under 
these pressures and strains almost all top planning officials had to resign 
after 1961 and were replaced by seemingly more pUable and more 
conservative bureaucrats.
Although the N U C was successful in bringing some 
important economic reforms , their concentration was on more technical 
issues, like the trials of the Democrats, the writing of a new constitution 
and an election law. There was less importance put on such goals as 
education, industrial and agricultural modernisation and expansion, and 
land reform. As Weiker argues: "... A large part of the cause of the 
NUC's failure to achieve more in relation to these problems lay in its 
failure to exploit its political position; in acting more Uke orthodox 
pohticians than like non-poUtical, problem'Solving soldiers, the NUC 
may have missed what was a unique opportunity for Turkey to return to 
the road of rapid development..." .63
62 E.Ozbudun, (1966), pp. 23.
62 W.Weiker, (1963), pp. 152Л53.
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C. THE 1961 CONSTITUTION
The 1960 military intervention can be referred to as the 
intersection of the political, economic and social crisis of the 1950-1960 
period. The malfunctioning of the political system of this specific period 
was due to the lack of a tradition of compromise and respect for the 
opposition ( whichever form that opposition takes ), as well as to the 
tendency of the Turkish political system towards the construction and 
preservation of a strong state. Therefore, the 1960 military intervention 
presents the " melting pot " of two kinds of reactions. First, it is the 
product of the reaction of the bureaucratic-intelligentsia elites ( the 
traditional " state elites " since the Ottoman Empire ) to the rise of the 
" political elites ", represented by the Democrat Party. Second, the 
military coup refers to the fear of the erosion of the statist-elitist values 
and to the reaction of the military and the bureaucracy to the rise of the 
bourgeoisie and landowner, who were embraced within the political 
monopoly and injustice of the Democrat Party.
The formulation of a new constitution was one of the central 
aims of the military. The committee of the university professors, which 
was set up by the National Unity Committee, believed that what was 
necessitated was "..»the preparation of a constitution that will ensure the 
materialisation of a state of law, set up State organs, and ensure that State 
social institutions are placed on a democratic basis and on principles of 
right and justice, to replace the [ existing ] Constitution of the State which 
has been neglected and rendered inoperative...".^'' Actually, this 
constitution was going to be, once more, the declaration of the
‘^'Metin Heper, (1985), pp· 86'87.
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importance of the intellectual wave of the fifties and sixties, and the effort 
of this group to guarantee the protection of some statist-elitist values 
within the context of the integration of Turkey in the international 
capitalist system.
For A.Şeref Gözübüyük, accepting the constitutions as either 
the solution to all problems or the source of the problems is a wrong 
interpretation.^^ However, the general tendency in Turkey has been the 
interpretation of the weakening of the political system and the series of 
social and economic crisis as a legal problem.^^ Thus, each military 
inter\^ention was followed by a new , long and detailed constitution.
The group of professors appointed by the NUC for the 
preparation of the new constitution was replaced, as it was thought that 
"...such a group would not be sufficiently representative of public 
opinion...".^' On January 6, 1961 the NUC charged the Constituent 
Assembly for preparing the new Constitution. The Assembly was 
composed of two chambers: the National Unity Committee and the 
House of Representatives. The latter consisted of members either elected 
by the people through indirect elections, or by ones chosen by the Head 
of State, the NUC, the existing political parties ( the Republican People's 
Party and the Republican Peasant's Nation Party ), the bar associations, 
labour unions, the judiciary, universities, farmers' associations, the press, 
chambers of commerce and industry, etc.^
For Bülent Tanör, the Constituent Assembly had two 
important features. First, the NUC had to share its power in the
Şeref Gözübüyük, Açıklamalı Türk Anayasalan ( Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi Yalanlan, 1993 ), 
pp. IV
'^^Ergun Özbudun, Türk Anayasa Hukuku ( Ankara: Yetkin Ya^nnlan, 1993 ), pp. 25.
^Trgun Özbudun, " Constitutional Law", in Introduction to Turkish Law , Tuğrul Ansay and Don 
Wallace Jr., ( eds.), ( Deventer, Netherlands : Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1987 ), pp. 28.
^  Ibid., pp. 28 ;  William Hale, (1994), pp. 136-137.
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" foundation " of the new constitution with the partially elected House of 
Representatives. Second, the House of Representatives was more 
competent in the final formulation of the draft Constitution.
Having in mind the social composition of the Constituent 
Assembly, its establishment marked an important shift of power back to 
civilian hands. However, although only a minority of the members were 
chosen by the military, its ultimate weakness was the exclusion of the DP 
and the almost monopoly of RPP sympathisers. Actually, this monopoly 
strengthened the general expectation that "... a return to civilian rule 
would mean a return to RPP government...".^^
The main debate in the Assembly was between the liberals- 
representing the propertied class- and the social-reform-oriented groups- 
representing the intellectual elitists. The new constitution was a " reform- 
oriented " constitution and a compromise between these two groups, 
which underlined an effort for preventing the re-emergence of an 
authoritarian partisan regime based on massive parliamentary majorities. 
On May 27, 1961 the Constitutional Committee's draft was accepted by 
the Constituent Assembly, with only minor amendments, and came into 
force after being ratified by a popular vote on July 9, 1961.^^
According to Kemal Karpat : "...[ the 1961 Constitution ] it 
promised a wide range of economic and social programs, which could be 
carried out only by a strongly socialist state, and at the same time, 
espoused free enterprise and extensive political freedom, which called for
^^Bûlent Tanör, İki Anayasa 1961-1982 ( İstanbul: Beta Basın Yayım Dağınm A.Ş , 1994 ), pp. 16. 
‘^William Hale, (1994), pp. 137.
^’ Bülent Tanör, (1994), pp. 17.
^^William Hale, (1994), pp. 138. The process of evolution of the Constitution involved four different 
printed versions : 1) the Onar Commission; 2) the Ankara Proposal; 3) the Karal Committee; 4) 
Constiturion of the Turkish Republic, translated for the N UC by S.Balkan, A .E.Uysal and 
K.H.Karpat, Ankara, 1961. See Walter Weiker, (1963), pp. 65-72.
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less governmental intervention in the affairs of the society. The two sides 
agreed on a weak executive, not only because it would prevent the 
emergence of a " strongman ", but also because each group felt that it 
would be more able to promote its own views and enhance its position 
without interference from above...
The 1961 Constitution was quite different in nature from 
that of 1924. It accepted pluralism and provided the mechanisms for 
achieving it, while at the same time it introduced a system of division of 
powers and checks and balances to prevent autocracy. Thus, the new 
constitution was actually the outcome of the transformation of the 
"majoritarian concept of democracy to the pluralistic one "
According to Metin Heper, the 1961 Constitution seems to 
have been "...a last-ditch effort on the part of the bureaucratic 
intelligentsia to set the substantive, as well as the procedural, rules of the 
pohtical game in T u rk e y ..." .W h ile  the 1924 Constitution stated that 
the nation would exercise its sovereignty through the TG N A  ( art. 4 ), 
the same article in the 1961 Constitution stipulated that " the nation 
shall exercise its sovereignty through the authorised agencies as 
prescribed by the principles laid down in the Constitution ". This was 
actually the first step for the announcement of the Supremacy of the 
Constitution, one of the most important novelties introduced by the 1961 
Constitution. The distrust of the makers of the 1961 Constitution for the 
political elites, a system based solely on political parties and political 
participation, and above all, the memories of the general vote in the 
period 1950-1960 were the main reasons for the 1961 Constitution- "...not
^^Kemal Karpat, ( 1988 ) ,  pp. 143. 
' “^ Ergun Ózbudun, ( 1987), pp· 28. 
'’^Merin Heper, (1985), pp· 89.
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unlike the " republican synthesis " of the French Third RepubHc, or the " 
constitutional dualism " of the Bismarckian Reich, this Montesquieuist " 
mixed constitution" legitimised the de facto political influence of the 
bureaucratic intelligentsia...".'^
The supremacy of the Constitution was further stipulated in 
article 8 where : " Laws shall not be in conflict with the Constitution. 
The provisions of the Constitution are fundamental legal rules binding 
upon legislative, executive and judicial organs, and administrative 
authorities and other agencies and individuals ". The realisation and 
preservation of this Constitutional supremacy was taken from a 
theoretical level to a practical and legal one by the creation of the 
Constitutional Court, which had the power to review the constitutional 
validity of statutes4^
Bùlent Tanor identified the main factors for the 
transformation from the Supremacy of the Parliament ( 1924 
Constitution ) to the supremacy of the Constitution (1961 Constitution). 
The 1924 Constitution was formulated in a period where the central aim 
was the nation-building, the sculpture of a new society, modernisation, 
and radical reforms. Thus, the elevation of the nation to the standards of 
the Western modern civilisation was more important than the supremacy 
of law or Constitution. On the other hand, the real problématique for 
the 1960s was the building and preservation of political democracy. The 
supremacy of the Constitution was an indispensable element of this 
project, having in mind the political crisis lived in the absence of this 
supremacy.'®
''>Ibid„ pp. 8«.
^^Ergun Ozbudun, ( 1993), pp. 17'18. 
Tanor, ( 1994), pp. 21.
'^ i ., 8
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Second, the 1924 Constitution was formulated in a period 
where the political power had an authoritarian and non-competitive 
character. On the other hand, the makers of the 1961 Constitution knew 
that they had come for a short period and that the return to the civilian 
rule would also make probable the return to the old political hands . 
Therefore, the supremacy of the Constitution was a guarantor for both 
acting under a legal umbrella and preserving the role of a watchdog after 
the return to civilian politics."“
The second important novelty introduced by the 1961 
Constitution was a " soft " division of powers and a system of checks and 
balances. This novelty introduced a fundamentally different concept from 
that of a "...legislature solely representing the will of the nation, defined 
as absolute, indivisible, and infallible...".®® The TG N A  had no more the 
concentration of the executive and legislative powers in its hands- as in 
the 1924 Constitution; now, there was a " soft " division between them 
which was balanced by another novelty- the independence of the 
judiciary. Under the new Constitution, the sovereignty of the nation was 
shared between the TG N A  and the authorised agencies of the state. Acts 
of parliament could also be referred for judicial review by a 
Constitutional Court of impartial judges.
The 1961 Constitution provided for a division of powers 
even within the body of the Turkish legislature. The Turkish Grand 
National Assembly took the form of a bicameral legislature, consisted of 
two chambers: the lower house and the Senate of the Republic. The 450 
members of the lower house were to be directly elected. The Senate 
consisted of 188 members, of whom 150 were to be elected, and fifteen
'4bid .,pp . 21.
®®Ergun Ozbudun, ( 1987 ), PP· 29.
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chosen by the President. The twenty-three members of the NUC were 
appointed senators for life. According to W.Hale, "...the last provision 
w'as hardly democratic, but it solved the problem of v/hat was to become 
of the N UC's members, granted that they could not easily be slotted back 
into their military careers...".
The new " spirit " of the 1961 Constitution involved not 
only the separation of powers and a system of checks and balances. 
Actually, the " new spirit " was a harmonious choreography between the 
notion of limited government, the independence of the judiciary and the 
rule of law. Article 2 of the Constitution describes the Turkish Republic 
as a State of Law- ...a State that respects human rights and establishes a 
just order of law whereby these rights are protected and maintained. All 
actions and functions of such a State must be in conformity with law and 
the Constitution. In a State bound by the principle of rule of law, the law 
absolutely prevails over all institutions of the State, including the 
Legislature...".®^ The principle of the rule of law requires the existence of a 
democratic political system and gives birth to the concepts of human 
rights, equality, judicial review of legislative and administrative acts and 
the independence of the judiciary.
Another important point to be looked at is the 6th Article of 
the Constitution which stipulates that " the Executive function shall be 
carried out ....within the framework of law ". A comparative analysis of 
articles 5, 6, and 7 offers the clues for understanding that the makers of 
the constitution aimed at providing for an effective limitation of a
«'William Hale, ( 1994), pp. 138.
®^Rona Aybay, " The Consriturional and Judicial Review in Turkey \  in Armağan : Kanun-U 
Esasi’nin 100. Yılı , ( Ankara: A.Û Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınlan No: 423, 1978 ), pp. 338'339; 1 
Anayasa Mahk. Kar. Der. 343 ( 348 ).
45
possible arbitrary rule by the administration.®^ Therefore, the 
Constitution regards the Executive as a function ( art. 6 ), while the 
Legislative and Judicial branches are referred to as powers ( art. 5 and 7 ). 
Also, the Executive branch and the institutions of public administration 
have to act in accordance with the statutes enacted by the Legislature. In 
addition to this, the Supreme Administrative Court ( Danıştay ) controls 
the validity of administrative acts and actions without any exception.
The indivisibility of administration and centralism is 
stipulated in Art. 112/2 : "...In terms of organisation and functions, the 
Administration is a whole..". However, Art. 116 recognises the principle 
of decentralisation and provides for a harmony and cooperation between 
various parts of the Administration. The local administrative units are 
public corporate bodies whose organs are elected by universal suffrage; 
and, are secured by the judiciary. Therefore, the division of powers and 
functions was not only a principle for the horizontal axis of the 
administration, but also for the vertical axis between the centre and the 
periphery.®^
Under the 1961 Constitution, universities and the Turkish 
Radio and Television ( TRT ) were given autonomous status ( art. 120 
and 121 ). The constitutional declaration of the universities and TRT as 
public corporate bodies enjoying academic and administrative autonomy 
was inspired from the notion of pluralistic democracy, which took the 
place of the majoritarian concept of democracy of the 1924 Constitution. 
The scientific function of free research and teaching of the universities 
and the function of the radio and television for the formation of an
Ibid., pp. 339.
®^Ergun Ôzbudun, ( 1993 ), pp. 20.
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independent and true public opinion could only be crystallised under a 
democratic rule beyond the reach and control of the government.s^
Thus, the makers of the 1961 Constitution aimed at the 
establishment of a system in which the prevention of a monopoly of 
political power - such as in the pre-1960 period- would be guaranteed by 
the supremacy of the Constitution, the division of powers and the 
limitation of political power through certain autonomous, independent, 
and non-political institutions: the Constitutional Court, the Supreme 
Council of Judges, the Supreme Election Board and the Universities.®^
The implementation, vitalisation and preservation of a liberal 
and pluralistic democracy was not only a matter of constitutional 
limitations imposed on the executive and the legislature. Moving beyond 
the division of state-powers and the system of checks and balances, the 
makers of the 1961 Constitution aimed at the construction of a pluralistic 
system through the active political participation of different social 
groups.®  ^ Therefore, there were certain provisions that provided for the 
development of a pluralistic society which would, in turn, be the basis for 
the consolidation of a pluralistic democratic system.
Political parties, being the mediators between society and 
state and having an important role in the decision-making process, were 
given a legal status and guarantees - for the first time - in the new 
Constitution. Article 56/3 stipulates that "...being in government or in 
opposition, political parties are indispensable elements of the democratic 
political life...". The right for unionisation, collective bargaining and 
strike ( art. 46 and 47 ) , the right for forming associations and societies
®4bid., pp. 19.
®®Rona Aybay, ( 1978 ), pp. 338,- Bûlent Tanôr, ( 1994 ), pp. 24. 
®Trgun Ôzbudun, ( 1993 ), pp. zO.
47
without prior permission ( art. 29 ) were actually some of the legal 
guarantees of the new constitution for opening the path to the formation 
of a pluralistic society.®®
In harmony with the spirit of the new constitution, there was 
a special emphasis put upon the subject of rights and liberties. The 
Turkish Constitution of 1961 recognised not only the classical liberties of 
personal freedom, the inviolability of domicile, privacy, freedom of 
communication, freedom to travel and reside where one likes, etc., but 
also freedom of religious faith and worship and freedom from abuse of 
one's religion by others were quaranteed.
Although the 1924 Constitution accepted most of the 
classical liberties, the Legislature had the exclusive right to define their 
limits. Since there were hardly any constitutional limitations to the 
supremacy of the legislature, civil liberties could easily be manipulated or 
rendered meaningless.®^ The 1961 Constitution guaranteed Turkish 
citizens a wide variety of rights and freedoms, which were stipulated in a 
detailed manner. In contrast to the 1924 Constitution, there was the 
addition of the " social rights " in the new Bill of Rights; some actions 
and freedoms ( political parties ) were guaranteed; and , there was 
reference to the essence and definition of each right and freedom in the 
concerning articles.
Bülent Tanör argues that there were four important 
principles introduced in the area of the formulation and guarantee of civil 
rights and liberties.^° First, any limitation imposed should have a 
constitutional basis. Thus, the provisions of the new constitution
®®Ibid., pp. 21.
®^Ergun Ûzbudun, ( 1987 ), pp· 29. 
■ OBûlentTanör, ( 1994 ),pp . 26.
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effectively limited the scope of legislative action with respect to civil 
liberties. Second, any limitation imposed should be in harmony with the 
statutes and the spirit of the constitution. Third, any limitation should be 
by law, and not by administrative action. Fourth, the law could not 
infringe upon the essence of any right or liberty ( art. 11 ). This was 
rather reinforced by the Constitutional Court which prohibited any 
infringement that would make the exercise of a right or liberty impossible 
or particularly difficult.^^
The notion of " Social State " was a novelty of the 1961 
Constitution. Art. 2 of the Constitution states that "...The Turkish 
Republic is a national, democratic, secular and social State under the rule 
of law, based on human rights and the fundamental principles set forth 
in the Preamble Through a planned economy, the concept of " Social 
State " puts the State under the obligation of meeting the needs of its 
citizens , and envisages a minimum standard of welfare for the individual. 
Minimum wages, the regulation of the conditions of work, the right to 
establish trade unions, the right to bargain collectively and the right to 
rest were some of the devices by which the Constitution intended to 
provide the poorer classes with the means by which they can strive for a 
higher standard of living in an organised and democratic manner.
However, could a country fighting for economic 
development and accumulation of capital provide such extensive social 
and economic rights without sacrificing the principle of social justice ? 
Art. 53 stipulated that : "...the State shall carry out its obligations to 
attain the social and economic goals set forth in this section only insofar 
as shall be permitted by its economic development Would this article
” 'Ergun Ôzbudun, ( 1987 ), pp· 30. 
Rona Aybay, ( 1978 ), pp· 336.
49
be taken as a basis for abandoning the responsibilities of the state in the 
field of social and economic rights ? Actually, I would argue that the 
makers of the 1961 Constitution aimed at a harmonious cooperation 
between rapid economic development and social justice. Therefore, the 
introduction of the institution of State Planning Organisation was the 
recognition of the need for a planned economy, where both the state and 
society would attain their aims in a smooth way. The State Planning 
Organisation was entitled to develop plans for economic, social and 
cultural development, though its structure and the implementation of its 
plans were left to special regulation by law. In addition, all natural wealth 
and resources were under state control, and private exploitation could be 
carried out only with state permission and supervision.
If the 1961 Constitution was going to be the first step for the 
return to civilian politics, what were going to be the future relations 
between the civilians and the army ? The new Constitution reinstated the 
position of 1944-9 , in that the Chief of the General Staff was again made 
directly responsible to the Prime Minister rather than the Minister of 
Defence.^^ The establishment of the National Security Council by the 
constitution was an exit guarantee for the National Unity Committee. 
According to Art. 111 of the 1961 Constitution the NSC consisted of the 
President, the main cabinet Ministers, the Chief of the General Staff and 
the serving force commanders and would provide to the government 
advice on defence and security questions.^‘’
Although the 1961 Constitution was accepted by the 
Constituent Assembly and ratified by a popular vote of % 61.7 on July 9, 
1961 , there was a wave of criticism which should not be forgotten. The
William Hale, ( 1994 ), pp. 138.
^''Metin Ôztürk, Ordu ve Polirika , ( Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınlan, 1993 ), pp. 73.
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new Constitution was not the product of a social consensus, as the 
predominance of the RPP sympathisers and the exclusion of the 
Democrat Party was one of the most striking features. Also, the 
constitution was not accepted under a democratic system, but under the 
rule of the National Unity Committee. Therefore, the % 40 of the 
negative votes for the constitution was either represented by the 
discontent sympathisers of the excluded DP, or by those that saw the 
constitution as the product of the military
Celal Bayar criticised the 1961 Constitution as being nothing 
more than the constitutional legitimation of the bureaucracy and the 
intellectuals.^^ The previous majoritarian concept of democracy and the 
Supremacy of the Legislature had been limited in certain ways by the 
imposition of non'political institutions as partners in the political game of 
the country and the Supremacy of the Constitution. Therefore, the 
criticisms of the Justice Party- the heir of the excluded DP- that the 
country could not be ruled by such a constitution were the natural 
outcomes of a discontent emerging from a different conception of the 
democratic politics; a conception that in the immediate past had been 
badly manipulated and transformed into a political monopoly of a 
majoritarian dictatorship.
The 1961 Constitution and the new electoral laws- providing 
for a system of proportional representation- changed the path of the 
evolution of the Turkish political system. The new constitution with its 
liberal provisions on civil liberties and the new legal-political institutions 
were great innovation and the firing of a future problematic political 
situation . A new era of coalitions began with the elections of October
^Tгgun Ozbudun, ( 1993 ), pp· 23. 
“^Medn Heper, ( 1985 ), pp· 89.
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15, 1961. The first Grand National Assembly of Turkey's second 
Republic convened in Ankara on October 25, 1961. On October 27 
General Gürsel was elected President of the Republic. After negotiations, 
the first coalition of the Republic was formed between the RPP and the 
JP. Without a culture of consensus, respect for the opposition and 
coalitions, how was Turkey's political life going to evolve ? Was the 
formation of coalitions the right step to be taken as the process of re 
démocratisation was just starting? The return to civilian politics was 
opening new pages in the political life of the country, while at the same 
time the present could not be predicted as a panacea or an anathema for 
the coming future.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE 12 SEPTEMBER 1980 MILITARY INTERVENTION
A. TH E PATH TO TH E 1971 ULTIM ATUM : 196M 971
The 1961 general elections opened a new page in the Turkish 
political history. The results of the elections were a disillusionment for the 
military. No party had an overall majority in the new parliament; the 
RPP had gained only a small lead over the JP ( 173 to 158 seats ), with 
two smaller parties, the New Turkey Party and the Republican Peasants' 
Nation Party holding the balance of power and the arithmetical 
possibility of a coalition government. Thus, in effect, the electorate had 
returned to power the party- or the parties- which had close ties with the 
DP ousted by the military only the previous year. The hard-line officers 
in the Armed Forces Union ( AFU ) decided that the elections had not , 
in the words of Talat Aydemir " completely realised the National Will " 
and that some sort of intervention would be necessary.“^
A powerful group led by Cemal Tural- Martial Law 
Commander and Commander of the First Army in Istanbul- signed the 
" 21 October Protocol " which threatened intervention in order " to 
entrust the revolution to the true and competent representatives of the 
nation, to prohibit all political parties and to annul the election results as 
well as abolish the N U C " The 21 October Protocol was a manifesto of 
a coup which had certain weaknesses. First, the military was unprepared 
for such a coup, as the results of the 1961 elections were a bad suprise for
William Hale, ( 1986), pp. 12.
D. Dodd, " Sustaining Forces: The Military and the Bureaucracy ", in Democracy and 
Development in Turkey , (  Walkington: I he Eothen Press, 1979 ), pp. 137.
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them. Second, the authors of the protocol had no plans for the regime to be 
installed after the coup. According to William Hale, "...to put it into effect, 
the signatories needed to carry the senior commanders in Ankara with 
them, since they do not seem to have prepared a cou n ter-cou p".However, 
the N U C members were in a dilemma. On the one hand, they wanted to 
prevent a victory on the part of the supporters of Menderes. On the other 
hand, the coup, expected to be made by 25 October at the latest, would 
probably be the source of discontent and problematic situations both 
domestically and internationally.
In order to find a solution to the dilemma of the top 
commanders, Cevdet Sunay called an extra-ordinary meeting on October 
23 of his four force commanders and a number of other senior officers. On 
October 24, 1961 a number of compromise proposals were discussed with 
the leaders of the political parties in the presidential mansion at 
Çankaya. According to the " Çankaya Protocol " , decided on and 
accepted by the parties' leaders on 24 October 1961, ismet İnönü would 
become Prime Minister and political parties would support the election of 
Gürsel as the President of the Republic. On October 26, 1961 İnönü 
formed a coalition government with the Justice Party. On 27 October 
Gürsel was elected President of the Republic . The complete return to 
civilian politics was implemented on 29 November , when the İnönü 
government was sworn in and the NUC was dissolved.
Before looking at the political scene of Turkey during this 
period, it is important to look at the newly emerging Justice Party, as it was
■ •William Hale, ( 1994 ), pp. 146. 
'^Ibid., pp. 147.
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going to be a great protagonist in the evolution of the democratic politics of 
the country. The establishment of the JP after the 1960 military 
intervention- 11 February 1961- meant the continuation of the previously 
excluded Democrat Party. Therefore, the Justice Party - as well as the New 
Turkey Party and the Republican Peasants' Nation Party- as heirs of the 
Democrat Party were not easily accepted either by the military ( the N UC 
or the Armed Forces Union) or the RPP. There was always a mistrust, 
anxiety and suspicion against the JP, which was further reinforced by two 
events: firstly, in the referendum for the ratification of the 1961 
Constitution with a % 39.4 vote of discontent; and secondly, in the 
national elections of 15 October 1961 , by becoming the second party 
following the RPP, which was unable to gain an absolute majority.
For Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, the JP carried two important 
features that made it a unique source of analysis for understanding Turkish 
politics. First, the JP came as the heir of the excluded Democrat Party 
and as the product of the 1960 military intervention. Second, the military 
had been a very influential factor in the implementation of the party's 
politics and the formulation of its ideology. In order to escape from the 
suspicious and sometimes " oppressive " tendencies of the military, it 
followed a double-face strategy, which can be analysed in two historical 
periods. From the establishment of the party till the death of R.Gümûşpala 
( 1964 ), the JP followed a strategy of " crouching down" ( sinme ) and 
" being loyal to the military " ( orduya bağlılık) ; the other face of the coin
Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, AP- Ordu İlişkileri : Bir İkilemin Anatomisi ( İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 
1993 ), pp. 48. 
ı°4bid., pp. 29-31; 49.
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was the strategy of neutralising the military for coming closer to it, 
beginning with the party leadership of S.Demirel in the Second Grand 
Congress on November 27-29, 1964.
The 21 October Protocol carried an important role for the JP, 
as for the first time the party presented concessional tendencies and a 
compromise towards the military. Although there was an electoral support 
for the Justice Party, the oppressive and difficult times in its relations with 
the military, since its establishment, played a greater role in understanding 
that there was no way to oppose the 27 May regime and the military. Thus, 
as the opposite of the DP, the JP was very cautious in its relations with the 
military. In order to show its good will to the military, the JP-dominated 
parliament in 1966 elected Cevdet Sunay the President of the Republic , 
"...who had prevented the coup of 1961 and the uprisings of Aydemir and 
who would be a guarantee for both the JP and the political regime of the 
country ".10^
İnönü headed a series of three unstable coalitions until 
February 1965, when he finally retired from the premiership. Continuing 
concern for the question of an amnesty for those ex-Democrats who had 
been convicted at Yassiada, opened the path for two more unsuccessful 
intervention attempts in- 1962 and 1963. Both attempts were led by Talat 
Aydemir- the War School Commander- and both failed due to the chain of 
command by most of the military establishment and to the military's trust 
in the political resourcefulness of İnönü. The execution of Aydemir and one 
of his principal collaborators meant the end of the rash of plotting and the
pp. 49'50,
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politicisation of the middle and lower ranks of the officer corps which had 
continued unchecked after the return to civilian rule in 19615^
The advancing popularity of the Justice Party led to its victory 
in the 1965 general elections . In spite of the decline of its votes, in 1969, it 
retained its absolute majority in the Assembly and continued to be in power 
until the military forced the JP government to resign in March 1971. 
However, the rise of the JP and its new moderate leader- S. Demirel- did not 
come alone. The Labour Party (LP) emerged as the spokesman for the 
leftists which consisted of Marxist workers, intellectuals, and a variety of 
marginal groups. This caused internal disputes within the fragmented RPP 
which underwent important transformations. B.Ecevit became the Secretary 
General of the RPP and the party platform took the new principle of the left 
of centre. On the other hand, the liberal and middle-of-the-road group of 
the RPP, headed by Turhan Feyzioglu, resigned and formed its own 
Reliance Party in 1967.^ *^ ^
Although there was an increase in prosperity rates and the JP 
had managed to gain a large majority for effective government, dissension 
within the JP was not absent. The party of the liberal wing of Demirel had 
to face a right wing which included religious, ultra-conservative, and former 
Democrat Party elements. This was actually the calling for the creation of 
the chauvinist and anti-Communist Nationalist Action Party (NAP) of A. 
Turke§ in 1969 ( as the revitalisation of RPNP which had been taken over 
by Ttirke§ in 1965 ) and the Islamic and anti-western National Order Party
^ "^^George Harris, " Tlie Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s ", in State, Democracy and the 
Military : Turkey in the 1980s , Merin Heper and Ahmet Evin ( eds. ), ( Berlin, New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1988), pp. 185. 
lO^Kemal Karpat, ( 1988 ), pp. 145.
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( later the National Salvation Party) of N.Erbakan in 1970. On the other 
hand, forty-one right-wing dissidents defected to form a new Democratic 
Party in May 1970, representing those of the Justice Party who had resigned 
because of their resentment to the rise of Demirel to the party leadership in 
1964 and their exclusion from a ministerial post in the cabinets formed. 
106 This was actually a crucial period for the JP , as the internal disputes 
and fragmentation were coupled with the violence of this specific period, 
undermining the control of the government over the critical situation.
Growing industrialisation and rising inflation created the 
conditions favourable for the emergence of a strong trade unionism, and 
especially " the radicalisation of trade union leadership " , which developed 
with the founding in 1967 of the leftist breakaway union confederation, the 
Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions, known by its Turkish 
acronym, DISK .^ *^ 7
What was going to be the lethal shock to the Turkish 
democracy was not the existence of extremist parties or the country's 
ideological and political polarisation; rather, it was the transformation of 
these divisions within the Turkish society into a wave of violence. 
Universities were full of bloody clashes between left-wing students 
influenced by the youth-radicalism in France in 1968 and right-wing 
students with strong nationalist feelings and an inherent opposition to 
socialist-internationalism and Marxism-which implied the Soviet threat. 
While the left was becoming more and more radical and Marxism was
’o^William Hale, ( 1994 ), pp. 180.
'°  C.H.Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy , ( Walkington: The Eothen Press, 1983 ), pp. 10. 
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58
becoming the ideology of some university circles, trade unions, the press, 
and professional organisations, there was the accompanied resurgence of 
active nationalist and religious feelings. The NAP and the NSP were the 
beneficiaries of these feelings which tried to increase their political 
popularity and attain their political ends. The NAP, by forming the Grey 
Wolves, was itself involved in violence.
Another important and problematic issue in the politics of this 
period was the amnesty problem of the former Democrats, which required a 
constitutional amendment supported by a two-thirds majority in the 
parliament. In 1968 , the New Turkey Party and the Justice Party's congress 
brought the issue of amnesty again in the political stage of the country. 
Surprisingly, in 1969 İnönü announced that the RPP also favoured the 
proposal. This move from the part of the RPP was actually a sign of 
preparation for gaining the support of the electorate and softening the 
image of the party in the rightist circles.
Although the amendment was passed by the lower house on 14 
May 1969, the military strongly opposed the change while it was in its way 
to the Senate. The fear of the government for a coup d'état forced the 
Prime Minister to show again an incredible sign of compromise and was 
forced to convince the Justice Party's Senators not to support the 
amendment.
The Istanbul's Bloody Sunday of 16th February 1969, the 
uncontrolled waves of violence within the universities and outside, coupled
Cizre-Sakallioglu, ( 1993 ), pp. 79.
"°Ibid ., pp. 80. TTie amendment was finally passed by the Senate on 5 November 1969; amended again 
by a decision of the Constitutional Court; and finally passed on 16 June 1974 ( See, Merin Óztürk, 
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with the inability of the police for preventing all this anarchy and the fear 
that the government had lost control over its own followers and was unable 
to deal with the extremism of the left and right, were the motives which 
forced the military to intervene and to handle domestic turmoil and 
anarchy.'"
B. THE 1971-73 MILITARY RULE
The 1971 coup-by-pronundamento was made by the top 
generals who had been " supersensitive to the issue of politicisation and 
factionalisation within the military The memorandum issued by the 
top echelons of the Turkish military was sent to the President and the 
speakers of the two chambers of parliament. The ultimatum was broadcast 
on Turkish radio on 12 March 1971:"^
" 1) Through their persistent policy, views and actions, parliament and the 
government have driven our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife and 
social and economic unrest. In the public mind, they have destroyed the 
hope of reaching the level of contemporary civilisation, which Ataturk set 
as our goal. They have failed to carry out the reforms which were envisaged 
in the Constitution , and have thus plunged the future of the Turkish 
Repubhc into acute danger.
2) The measures which are needed to end the concern and 
disillusionment felt about this grave situation by the Turkish nation and
 ^  ^  ^ Ibid., pp. 12.
Hq3CT, ( 1987 )> PP· 57.
Hale, ( 1994 ), pp. 184^185.
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the Armed Forces which spring from its bosom should be assessed by our 
parliament in a non-partisan spirit. It is considered essential that a powerful 
and credible government should be set up, within the democratic rules , 
which will end the present anarchic situation, wdl take up the reforms 
envisaged in the Constitution, in the spirit of Ataturkism, and will 
implement reformist laws.
3) If this is not speedily undertaken, the Turkish Armed Forces, carrying 
out the duty which is given to them by law to protect and preserve the 
Turkish Repub he, are determined to take over the administration 
directly...".
What were the reasons for the military ultimatum of 1971 1 The 
fragmentation within the Justice Party and the emergence of ultra- 
conservative rightist parties, such as the Nationalist Action Party and the 
National Order Party, were an important factor for cutting down the 
support for the Justice Party. In addition to this, the New Democratic Party 
of the dissidents of the JP was a crucial partner in the combination of the 
RPP with the above mentioned " disparate opposition parties " in voting 
down the government's first budget in February 1970.^^  ^ Observers, 
including the military were left uncertain as to whether Demirel could carry 
on as Prime Minister.
Moreover, the situation within the armed forces played a 
crucial role in the breakdown of democracy in 1971. First, the polarisation 
and fragmentation of the political system was accompanied by a wave of 
terrorism and violence that led to the breakdown of law and order.
William Hale, ( 1986), pp. 17.
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particularly in the universities. Therefore, the military was at unease and 
worried about the future of the country.
Second, the politicisation of the armed forces and their 
increasing tendencies towards interventions in the political stage were not 
prevented. The " Menderes complex " of the Justice Party and its strategy of 
compromise and concessions given to the military- for having itself been 
accepted within the circles of the military- proved to be a lethal shock for 
both the JP and the Turkish democracy.^ 5^ yhe radicalisation within the 
military had taken the form of a " reformist " viewpoint of some young 
officers- especially in the Air Force- who, like their predecessors in the early 
sixties felt that the solution to the disorder could only be found in the 
implementation of the economic and social reformism which had inspired 
the 27 May coup. If this reformist viewpoint reflected the policies of the 
" left-of-centre " RPP of 1965, another group of radicals - like the radicals of 
1960-61- advocated that a liberal democratic system was not a stable basis 
for real progress; thus, they advocated the establishment of an authoritarian 
regime which, they believed, "...would make Turkey more egalitarian, more 
independent and more " modem " , in spite of itself.
Although both the JP and the military shared the same " right 
and anti-Communist " line of thinking, this fact has never been sufficient 
for an alliance between the JP and the military. Umit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 
argues that there were two factors preventing this alliance.* O n  the one 
hand, the JP and the military were bound together by a historical
81.* *^Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, ( 1993 ), pp
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antagonism. As long as the JP was trying to legitimise itself in the eyes of 
the military by the strategy of compromise and concessions, what was 
possible to be implemented was not an alliance between them, but only a 
somewhat peaceful coexistence. On the other hand, the JP had never 
planned to use the military against the left - at least until that moment. 
Although anti'communism was the common point between the JP and the 
military, the latter showed tendencies of politicisation that refused the 
notion of civilian authority over the military. Therefore, it was the 
tendency of the military to refuse action under the supervision of the 
civilian authority that prevented the JP from seeking an alliance with the 
militar^  ^ on the " communist threat Thus, an alliance had not taken 
place in the program of the JP. When the left-right polarisation began 
within the society and the military, any plan for a possible alliance between 
the two groups was hardly possible. If the left-wing of the military could not 
have been even thought as an ally, the authoritarian right-wing of the 
military and a possible alliance was out of question. Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 
argues that the JP was a party based on national will and elections. In order 
not to put into danger their image in the eyes of the electorate, an alliance 
with the right-wing military had to be prevented; a short run "co-operation" 
with them would probably be the beginning of a problematic situation in 
the long run.'-°
Under such critical times, the top echelons of the military 
decided to make the 1971 coup-by-pronunciamento in order to head off a 
coup by the colonels. The top generals had become supersensitive to the
Further information on Ibid., pp. 66-68.
>2%id., pp. 87.
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issue of politicisation and factionalisation within the military. The 1971 
coup kept the hierarchy intact, as the intervention was preceded by several 
meetings among a circle of top generals, aimed at developing a consensus 
within the military regarding the necessity of the inten^ention.^^^ The 
makers of the coup had no specific plans for the period after the ultimatum, 
except from the belief that "...some of the programmatic injunctions of the 
1961 constitution had been overlooked by the previous governments, and 
they demanded that appropriate measures be taken.....wdthout going into 
details as to what exactly should be done...".*^^
According to Metin Heper, the importance of the 1971 
takeover lies in the fact that , from 1971 on the military increasingly chose 
to act alone, as in their opinion " they no longer had, as far as the 
guardianship of the Repubhc was concerned, any natural allies among the 
civilian intelHgentsia or the poUtical p a r t i e s . " S i n c e  the military was 
concerned about the polarisation and factionalisation within their ranks, on 
15 March 1971 three generals and eight colonels were dismissed from the 
forces, on the grounds that they had broken military law by "...going 
outside the hierarchic mechanism and had engaged in political activities 
basically irreconcilable with the disciplinary rules of the Armed 
F o r c e s . A l s o ,  on 7 July 1971 a group of military officers and civilians 
under the leadership of ex-General Cemal Madanoglu was arrested and
'21 William Hale, ( 1994 ), pp. 189-193. 
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brought before a martial law court in January 1973, accused of conspiring 
against the state and trying to subvert the armed forces9-5
After the resignation of Demirel, President Sunay appointed 
Nihat Erim in the position of premier. Erim was a former Professor of Public 
Law in Ankara University, a deputy of RPP in 1945, and a minister in the 
last two governments under Inonii's presidency in 1948-50, returning to 
parliament. After his formal resignation from the RPP, Erim tried to act in a 
non-partisan way as the other members of the cabinet were to be chosen 
from outside the parliament. The first Erim government proved to be very 
unstable , as it had sworn in with the joint support of JP and RPP. Demirel 
could hardly express open approval of a government which, in his view, 
had come to power quite illegitimately. However, in order to retain some 
power and influence in the new order, he allowed members of his party to 
join the cabinet and give approval to the parliament. On the RPP side, 
there was a confusion between two camps: those who favoured the 
memorandum as expressing their own party programme; and those who 
were against the notion of military intervention, under the fear that, if there 
was an approval of it, people would make a link between the party and the 
military. The resignation of Ecevit from his post as a protest to the new 
regime on 21 March predicted that a democratic opposition to the Erim 
government would be carried by him.^26
The move against disorder began with the imposition of martial 
law in a number of provinces; a broad wave of arrests of suspects- a number 
of whom had no direct connection with violence; over 400 intellectuals
Ibid., pp. 186. 
Ibid., pp. 195.
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were arrested; the Turkish Labour Party was closed down; leftist 
publications were shut down; and the members of the TLP were accused of 
propagating communist propaganda and advocating autonomy for the 
Kurds. 127
There is a lot of debate whether some changes in the 1961 
Constitution were in the initial program of the 1971 ultimatum or not. It is 
important to note that the JP had always been in the side of some basic 
revisions of the Constitution, as the division of powers, the Supremacy of 
the Constitution and the institutional agencies of the 1961 Constitution 
were a burden to their majoritarian conception of democracy. Thus, in 
1969, with their Electoral Platform they had made their proposals. The 
imposition of Martial Law and the restrictions imposed on the active sector 
of the society ( restrictions on strikes, associations and trade unions, etc. ) 
had created a negative impression both domestically and internationally. 121^  
Thus, under the pressures of the military and the conserv'ative parties in the 
parliament, a lengthy constitutional amendment was enacted in September
1971.
What were the main tendencies in the implementation of the 
1971 Constitutional amendments 1 George Harris argues that there were 
two general approaches : " a) strengthening the powers of the government 
against threats to national unity, public order, and national security; and, b) 
increasing the autonomy and freedom of action of the militarv^
‘ -'C.D.Dodd, ( 1983 ), pp. 13.
’ -®Bülent Tanör, ” 12 Mart Rejimi Anayasa Değişikleri ", in Armağan: Kanun-U Esasi'nin 100. Yılı 
( Ankara: A .f) Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınlan No: 423, 1978 ), pp. 427.
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establishment in more or less subtle w a y s . . .29 ¡ 9 7 1  amendments
changed 35 articles and added nine transitional articles.
So far as the establishment and functions of the state power is 
concerned, the military succeeded to take important concessions from the 
civil power. Thus, the capacity of the military judiciary was broadened by 
the introduction of the Military Administrative Court. Judicial review of 
administrative acts and actions concerning military personnel rests within 
the jurisdiction of the Military Administrative Court ( art. 140/end). 
Formerly, it was the Council of State which had this particular power of 
r e v i e w . I n  addition, the reasons for the imposition of martial law were 
broadened by new additions ( art. 124/1 ), and the possibility for civilians to 
be tried in Military Courts was increased ( 138/2 ). By the addition of 
paragraph 3 in Art. 127, the military showed its tendency to escape from 
the supervision of the civilian power. Thus, the supervision of the state 
properties of the Military would be reformulated by law under the premise 
of confidentiality required for the national security of the country.
In terms of bolstering the position of the armed forces, the 
amendment concerning Art. I l l  specified that the National Security 
Council could now present to the cabinet not only views but 
" recommendations " as well. In order to ensure their autonomy from the 
political elites, this legally institutionalised channel would be a good
George Harris, " The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s " , in State, Democracy and the 
Military: Turkey in the 1980s , Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin ( eds. ), ( Berlin, New York: Walter de 
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" instrument " of influence and, they would be able to prevent, " .....among
other things, the degeneration of the pohtical system..."
The 197 T73 amendments played a crucial role in the restriction 
of the power of the judiciary. The minor political parties had no right of 
appeal to the Constitutional Court ( Art. 149 ), and the statutes concerning 
the amendments of the Constitution were subject of review only as long as 
their form is concerned ( Art. 147/1 The introduction of the Military 
Administrative Court and its functions was another sign of the weakening 
of the power of the judiciary over the administration, the executive and the 
legislation. Also, the changes of Art. 56/4, 82, 138/1 and the Transitory 
Article 21 were devices that weakened the supremacy of the Constitution 
and the independence of the judiciary and introduced the notion that " the 
Constitution should not be in conflict wdth laws" ( anayasa karşı hile 
These changes concerned those statutes that had been annuled by the 
Constitutional Court previously, but had been incorportated as 
constitutional articles later, in the 197T73 constitutional amendments of 
the 1970 military rule.
The strengthening of the executive and the legislature and the 
loosening of power of the judiciary were the central aims of the opposition 
to the 1961 Constitution. Thus, the new amendments realised their aims by 
giving power to the cabinet to issue decrees with the force of law when so 
instructed by the parliament ( Art. 64/2 ). The restrictions on the 
autonomy of the universities and the TRT ( Art. 120 and 121 ) reinforced
'^-Metin Hcper, ( I98i ), pp. 58.
Bülent Tanôr, ( 1994 ), pp. 56. 
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the strengthening of the executive and its return as a " single body " 
( yekparelik ) ; the autonomous institutions had been characterised by 
N.Erim as the " duchies " of the 1961 Constitution , and the restrictions 
to their autonomous status opened the path for the homogeneity, 
centralisation and singularity of the executive.
The liberal element of the 1961 Constitution was also 
restricted. Beyond the restrictions imposed on the autonomy of the 
universities and the TRT, there lied amendments concerning restrictions on 
the civil liberties and rights. Thus, the reasons for the limitations on civil 
liberties and rights were increased ( Art. 15, 2 2 , 29, 46/1 ) under the vague 
spirit that " the nation and the national unity should be protected the 
legal protection of the individual had been restricted ( Art. 30 ); the 
individual duties had been increased ( Art. 60 ); and the reasons for the 
declaration of a state of emergency were softened and the transition to 
martial law had been made easier ( Art. 124/1).
The right to establish trade unions and the right for academic 
personnel to be members of political parties were forbidden ( Art. 119 and 
120 ). Small political parties were refused help by the Treasury ( Art. 56/end 
and Trans. Art. 22 ) and they were refused the right for appeal to the 
Constitutional Court ( Art. 149 Also, the executive had gained 
important power in the formulation and restriction of the civil liberties and 
rights, while the judiciary was loosing control ( Art. 19/end, 22/3, 29, 30 ); 
the notion of " natural judiciary " ( tabii yargı yolu ) had been transformed
Ibid., pp. 57.
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in the notion of " legal judiciary" ( kanuni yargı yolu ) by such devices as 
the trial of civilians in military courts, the imposition of the Military 
Administrative Court, the flexibility in the declaration of martial law, and 
the establishment of the Court of the Security of the State ( Devlet 
Güvenlik Mahkemesi )J
Although the military had intervened on the grounds of 
demanding the implementation of the " reforms envisaged in the 
Constitution in the spirit of Ataturkism ", the final outcome was completely 
different. What can be characterised as the product of the four governments 
of the " semi-military " period of 1971'73 was not actually a reformist 
liberal democracy, but a regime which opened the path to the 1980 military 
intervention. As the most important product of the 1971 ultimatum, the 
1971-73 amendments carried a negative character at the expense of liberal 
democracy. Therefore, there was a paradoxical situation: if the military had 
actually intervened for the incomplete reformist laws of the 1961 
Constitution and the mismanagement of the country by the Justice Party, 
why the outcome of these years had been a restriction of the liberal element 
of the Constitution, with the primary help of the party that had been 
criticised by its political failures ?
Although the military strongly supported the idea of non-party 
governments during the years of the " half-way coup both Erim
governments ( March to December 1971 and December 1971 to April 1972 
), the Melen government ( June 1972 to April 1973 ) and the Talu 
government ( April 1973 to October 1973 ) were based on a difficult
Bülent Tanör, ( 1978 ), pp. 437. 
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0^compromise between the existing political parties' especially the JP and the 
RPP. Moreover, the amendments of the 1961 Constitution clearly indicates 
that they were the product of the military and the conservative Justice 
Party, which looked after the ways of guaranteeing the governmental posts 
in the transitional period. Thus, the changes in the Constitution offered a 
more direct path of influence of the political stage for the military and the 
strengthening of the executive through weakening the power of the 
judiciary and the restriction of civil rights and liberties for the JP.
What was the actual importance of the indirect military rule of
1971'73 for the Justice Party ? First, there was a similarity between the 27
May regime and the 12 March regime : on the first occasion, it was the DP
*
that had been attacked by the military, while on the second occasion, the 
ultimatum had come for the JP- the heir of the excluded Democrat Party. 
Thus, the 1971 ultimatum was a turning point for the JP, both for its 
relations to the military and for the political philosophy of the party.
There is the paradox for JP during the years of the indirect 
military rule of both being the party attacked by the military's ultimatum 
and also being one of the most " loyal " supporters of the four unstable 
governments of 1971-73. Why ? According to Umit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, the 
answer to this question lies on the pragmatism of the party's strategy 
towards its relations with the military: a cooperation with the military in 
the short run thought to be a guarantor for the dismissal of it from the 
political scene in the long run.*^^ Therefore, the strategy of compromise and 
concessions had changed in nature. Now, there was not the anxiety of the
Cizre Sakallıoğlu, ( 1993 ), pp- 93. 
pp. 113.
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JP for legitimising itself in the eyes of the military; it was rather the 
" battle " of the party against the rise of Communism and the political work 
of the party for establishing a strong state formula, which will be the 
antidote for both the prevention of crisis situation and future military 
interventions.
If the essence of the 1971'73 amendments lies on the formula of 
a strong state- as put it against the dangerous rise of the left ideology- 
through the restriction of liberal elements of the Constitution , the 
presidential election crisis of 1973 represented another element of the 
transformation of the JP towards the military, and more generally " a crucial 
clash between the civilian politicians and the militar^c..."^^^. The end of 
President Sunay's term inaugurated the first opposition from all political 
parties to the will of the military for Faruk Gürler occupying the 
presidential mansion. The presidential election was supposed to be of great 
importance for the military as " they regarded the presidency ...being almost 
within their gift and....representing the military within the civilian political
system. " 143
However, the change of leadership in the RPP and the 
chairmanship of Bülent Ecevit was a crucial point in the clash between the 
military and the civilian politicians. Ecevit had always opposed the 12 
March regime; therefore, it was natural not to support the candidacy of 
Gürler, who was one of the four makers of the 1971 ultimatum. On the 
other hand, there was the JP and Demirel who refused to support Gürler 
under the fear that in the future he would not be appointed premier by a
Hale, ( 1994 ), pp. 203. 
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President having the " stamp " of the 12 March regime. This was actually 
another sign of the changing nature of the strategies of the JP, as in the past 
the President with a military background thought to be a guarantor for the 
party. After months of tension and various proposals of candidates, a 
compromise was made in the candidacy of ex-Admiral Koruttirk who was 
elected president by an overwhelming majority on April 6 , 1973.
According to William Hale, the experience of 1971-73 seem to 
have had three important effects during the succeeding period: ^^ 5" 
experience of martial law administration and the civilian government's loss 
of power , probably made subsequent prime ministers very reluctant to 
proclaim martial law again, until the breakdown of public order had 
already passed the point of no return; ii) the army seem to be reluctant to 
compromise on a future half-way coup, as in 1971; iii) the outcome of the 
presidential crisis of 1973 severely weakened the credibility of any future 
warnings which the military may issue to the government...".
C. THE POLITICS OF 1973 TO 1980
On October 1973, civilian rule returned in Turkey. However, 
none of the six competing parties won a majority and all failed to agree on a 
ruling coalition. The RPP- which had deviated to the left under the 
leadership of Ecevit- emerged as the strongest single party over its principal 
antagonist, the jP. An unlikely coalition with the ultraconservative NSP of 
N. Erbakan and the RPP was the result of a lot of manoeuvring between the
'■’ ■’Umit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, ( 1993 ), pp. 94.
’^^William Hale, ( 1994 ), pp. 211.
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parties. This coalition lasted until September 1974, when Ecevit resigned 
under the pressure of deep policy differences with the NSP. In 1975 Demirel 
returned to premiership with a right-wing coalition ( the Nationalist Front) 
between the JP, the NSP, the Reliance Party, and the NAP.
The general elections of 1977 proved to be the elections which 
united the ]P and the RPP under the same high hopes of forming a single- 
party government. In comparison to the election results of 1973, both 
parties had increased their share of the total vote; the JP got an increase of 
7 percentage ( % 36.9 ), while the RPP gained % 41.40 - 8  percentage points 
more than in 1973. The NAP also increased its electoral support ( from % 
3.4 to % 6.4 ), while the other smaller parties showed a decrease in their 
votes. According to Sabri Sayan, the JP, the RPP, and the NAP were
the beneficiaries of the intensified Left-Right cleavage and the polarisation 
of the Turkish political s y s t e m . transition from a predominant party 
system to moderate pluralism was again evident at the time when Demirel 
re-established the Nationalist Front in August 1977. The role of the NSP 
and the NAP was pivotal , having in their hands the government 
formation capability. The coalition period of Turkish politics was ended by 
the last coalition of Fcevit, the Independents, and other two minuscule 
parties ( the RRP and the DP ) which won a vote of confidence in January 
1978.
Sabri Sayan, " The Turkish Parry Svstem in Transition ", in Government and Opposirion , 
12: 39o7, ( 1978 ),pp. 631.
Ibid., pp. 632.
"^^^William Hale, ” The Role of the Electoral System in Turkish Politics ", in International Journal of 
Middle East Studies , vol: 11, 1980, pp. 403H04.
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According to Sabri Sayari, the 1970s were characterised by a 
political crisis which was leading to the breakdown of the system. The 
period was characterised by increasing political polarisation and 
fragmentation in the party system; rapid escalation of political violence and 
terrorism; growing militancy of anthsystemic forces at both extremes of the 
political spectrum; rising ministerial instability with short-lived coalition or 
minority-governments; and frequent lapses into parliamentary deadlock and 
policy immobilism.^"^  ^ The growth of fragmentation and polarisation 
significantly increased the vulnerability of the regime to a breakdown 
through a military coup.
At the level of the electorate, proportional representation had 
created the conditions for increased fragmentation of voter alignments, 
which were translated as highly fractionalised parliaments devoid of 
parliamentary durable majorities. At the level of political elites, there was 
the unwillingness of the centre-left RPP and the centre-right JP to reach a 
compromise despite the deterioration of the economy, the alarming rise of 
internal violence and the polarisation of the political life.
Rustow summed up the situation of the 1970s when he wrote 
that " Turkey’s political ills were not those of repression , but of excess of 
expression..". *51 Politically inspired terrorism had been temporarily 
suppressed by the martial law administration of 197T73, but by the late 
1970s it had re-emerged on a far more frightening scale. According to 
George Harris, the violence of the 1970s can be divided into three broad
Sayari, " Tlie Crisis of the Turkish Party System, 1973-1980 ", paper prepared for the conference 
on : " Histor^  ^ and Sociew in Turkey ", Berlin, December 18-20, 1981, pp. 1.
 ^^^Ibid., pp. 2
^^^Quoting Rustow, Metin Heper, ( 1985 ), pp. 123.
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categories, which can be loosely defined as ideological, sectarian and 
ethnic752 Yhe extreme left groups of the Turkish People's Liberation Front, 
the Maoist-inspired Turkish Workers and the Peasants Liberation Army 
carried out selected assassinations of prominent victims. There were bloody 
clashes between groups of the extreme left and the extreme right; TOB-DER 
and Dev'Genc were clashing with the re-formed Grey Wolves and the 
Association of Idealist Youth, both groups with connections with NAP. 
The events of Kahramanmaraş in 1978 were the expression of the 
intercommunal fighting of the primordial sectarian loyalties of Sunnis and 
Alevis. The violent confrontation of these cleavages had actually labelled 
themselves under the ideological division between the left( Alevis) and the 
extreme right( Sunnis). The third source of violence was the ethnic conflict 
of the Kurds versus the Turkish state. 5^3
The Kahramanmaraş incident and the declaration of martial 
law on Christmas Day 1978 was a turning point . The intensification of 
terrorism , violence and politicisation changed the neutral or passive role 
which the military had taken during 1973 to 1978. According to Mehmet 
Ali Birand, "...1979 would be the year in which the armed forces gradually 
moved from discussing the possibility of an " intervention " in private 
gatherings to open and direct discussions of its necessity to halt the slide 
into anarchy; indeed, from the second half of 1979, the question was simply 
one of " when and how to intervene "...".^^3 Actually, the military was not 
comfortable with Ecevit's insistence that , during martial law
^^^Quoting G.Harris, William Hale, (1994), pp. 224.
^^nVilliam'Halc, ( 1994 ), pp. 225  ^ 226.
Mehmet Ali Birand, The Generals' Coup in Turkey: An Inside Stor\·^  of 12 September 198Ö 
( London, New York, Toronto: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987 ), pp. 61.
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administration, they had to act as the " regime's policemen"- a joint 
administration of civilian and military powerd^^ interference of the 
civilian authorities in martial law reinforced the military's perception that 
the resolution of crisis could only be possible if they could have a free hand 
in applying their own means and methods. -56
In the autumn of 1979, the RPP suffered a total defeat in the 
partial elections when it lost five seats contested in the National Assembly, 
as a result of which Ecevit resigned from premiership. Demirel then 
established a minority government which in January 1980, introduced the 
economic stabilisation program recommended for years by Turkey's foreign 
creditors. However, the anarchic situation had found no remedy. On 
December 27, 1979 a warning letter was delivered to President Korutiirk 
demanding new legislation and administrative measures to strengthen the 
powers of the martial law c o m m a n d e r s .*57 Tbe Chief of Staff, K.Evren, and 
the force commanders suggested a " grand coalition" between the JP and 
the RPP as the remedy to the anarchic situation of the country and stated 
that military intervention would be the last resort, if n e c e s sa r y . *58
The President took an over-cautious position towards the 
generals by noticing that there was not the right time for a military 
intervention: "...The most important thing is not to solve questions wdth an 
iron fist. That is the last possible means. Try finding solutions within the 
democratic framework...".*59 Although the President informed Demirel and
'55William Hale, (1994 ), pp. 233.
Mehmet Ali Birand, ( 1987 ), pp. 61.
>5'William Hale, ( 1994 ), pp. 235.
' ‘'% id ., pp. 235; Mehmet Ali Birand, ( 1987 ), pp. 105. 
Mehmet Ali Birand, ( 1987 ), pp. 106.
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Ecevit of the warning letter, Demirel refused the idea of a coalition, 
reminding that his government would be able to deal with the situation. '<^ 0
The political confusion took serious forms with the presidential 
election crisis on April 1980, the refusal of Ecevit for early elections and 
generally the impossibility of a reconciliation between the top political 
leaders. Meanwhile, the military was well advanced in the plans for a 
military intervention which would not repeat the mistakes of those of 1960 
and 1971. What was professionally planned was the restructuring of the 
whole political system through the making of a new Constitution, new 
electoral laws and a new political parties Law, the prorogation of the 
parliament, and the imposition of the NSC as the responsible body of the 
g o v e r n me n t . T h e  initial date for the intervention was planned for July 
11, but Demirel's vote of confidence on July 3 postponed the coup for 
September
The disintegration, polarisation and fragmentation of the 
Turkish political system could not be prevented by the civilian powers. 
Whether the crisis situation was the expression of the unwillingness of the 
political leaders to unite under the urgency and danger of the times, or, as 
Rustow has earlier pointed out , " the product of the excess of expression " , 
it seems that the political leaders had not taken seriously the warning letter 
of Evren and the top commanders. According to William Hale, there was 
the disillusionment of the political leaders that they should have been left 
alone to solve the crisis situation , having in mind " ....the failure of the
'^William Hale, ( 1994 ), pp. 235.
*^^lbid., pp. 237.
’ ‘^ Mehmet Ali Birand, ( 1987 ), pp. 142, 145, 160.
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semi'tnilitary regime of 1971-73, the defeat of Gürler in the presidential 
elections of 1973, and the fact that they had themselves approved the 
appointments of most of the men at the top of the armed forces ...."7^3
By early September 1980, it was evident that a compromise in 
the political level was hardly possible. Therefore, the planned coup of the 
armed forces was an inevitable conclusion to the critical years of 1973 to 
1980. Mehmet Ali Birand describes in a vivid manner the " Operation Flag 
" on 12 September 1980: "....For the third time in twenty years, the 
airwaves carried the patriotic army march " Forward Turk, Forward...." 
across the breadth and length of the country. It was far too early to 
ascertain whether the country was going forward as the march suggested or 
taking a step backward with the impending suspension of parliamentary 
democracy. But for the Turkish citizens who heard the dawn broadcast and 
for the rest who would tune in during the next two to three hours as the 
nation woke up to another day ( 04:00 hours ), a sigh of reUef and a hearty 
" And about time, too! " seemed to be the overwhelming initial reaction. 
The deep-voiced announcer informed the nation that a new and a totally 
different chapter in the country's history had started..
D. THE 12 SEPTEMBER 1980 MILITARY INTERVENTION
The military intervention of 12 September 1980 was 
legitimising itself in the following tones: "... The aim of the operation is to
' '^’William Hale, ( 1994 ), pp. 239.
Mehmet Ali Birand, ( 1987 ), pp· 186.
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safeguard the integrity of the country', to provide for national unity and 
fraternity, to prevent the existence and the possibility of civil war and 
internecine struggle, to re-establish the existence and the authority of the 
state, and to eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working of the 
democratic order..."9^'’ Therefore, the military had come with four main 
tasks: 1) to suppress terrorism; 2 ) to restore economic growth and stability; 
3) to introduce a new Constitution and legal arrangements which would 
prevent another lapse into anarchy; and 4 ) to work out effective 
arrangements with the civilians.
The military intervention was actually welcomed by the 
majority of the Turkish people with relief due to the violence and anarchy 
in the streets. The coup was bloodless with the restoration of order as the 
immediate task of the army and the restructuring of the political system as 
the long-term aim. The military was presenting themselves as saviours and 
not as political power hunters.
The 1980 military coup was again legitimising its above politics 
role by guaranteeing that they had come for the restoration of democracy 
and not for destroying the democratic regime. Therefore, they intended to 
stay in power only for the time necessary to re-establish a healthy-working 
system. Starting with the late 1970s and continuing in the 1980s, military 
tried to isolate itself from any relationship with political parties. They 
believed that the more they isolated themselves from political parties, the 
more their prestige was increasing in the eyes of the people. Their belief in
’ ^Ticdn Hcpcr, { 1988), pp- 131.
Hale, ' Transition to CiHlian Governments in Turkey ", in The State, Democracy and the
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the six principles of Atatürk as a world view- not as the ideology of the 
politicised bureaucracy of the 1960s and 1970s- had made them to accept 
themselves as the enlightened wise authority which works for the best of the 
nation. The qualities of altruism, honour, hierarchy, conformity and 
integration for a long period of time had made them as the most trustful 
state institution in the eyes of the people.
The military claimed that it was the bad work of politicians 
that had caused the turmoil in the country, and the democratic system in 
itself. What they believed was the " rationalist democracy " of Atatürk, and 
considered themselves responsible only to the people and not to the 
Parliament or the government of the bad and irresponsible politicians. 
Kenan Evren, the leader of the coup, said that : "... we have not eliminated 
democracy. I would particularly Шее to point out that we were forced to 
launch this operation in order to restore democracy with all its principles, 
to replace a malfunctioning d e m o c r a c y . H o w e v e r ,  there was always 
the suspicion whether the military had come as guardians of the State and 
the Nation or as power seekers. The accusation of coming to power as 
political actors seeking to dominate the political stage for personal interests 
was coming especially from Demirel. He questioned the timing of the 
intervention and accused the military of deliberately having waited until the 
crisis was come to a deadlock for gaining the support and the relief of the 
people and legitimising their intervention.'^^
'^'James Brown, " The Military and Politics in Turkey ", in Armed Forces and Society , 13:2 , 1987, pp. 
240.
'^Kemal Karpat, ( 1988 ), pp. 149.
81
In order to govern the country the military took over the 
National Security Council, which was consisted of the chairmanship of 
Kenan Evren and the commanders of the army, the navy, the air forces, 
and the gendarmerie . A cabinet of twenty-six members, comprised by the 
military and civilian technocrats was formed, with a former admiral- Bülent 
Ulusu- as prime minister. One of the first task of the government was to 
declare Turkey's continuing adherence to NATO. Then, the government 
passed to the suppression of the conflict.
All strikes were called to an end and were banned. There was 
also an increase of seventy per cent to all workers who had come out on 
strike by the employers, under the orders of the new cabinet. Martial Law 
was declared in sixty-seven provinces. Trade union federations- the DISK 
and the MISK- were closed down and their leaders were arrested and trials 
began. The bureaucracy was purged for being politicised and a number of 
mayors and elected members of local councils were dismissed, their 
functions to be performed by the provincial governors.
The military believed that the pre-coup political parties had 
weakened the state, divided the citizenry, and promoted enmity among 
themselves . Because of the military's belief that "...political parties should 
be instruments of national unity, order, and stability rather than vehicles 
for the expression of special interests of social or economic groups or 
particular regions of the country..."'^!, all political parties had been banned 
from political activities at the time of the coup. The leaders of the existing
!<^°C.D.Dodd, ( 1983 ) , pp. 43-46.
. ''*^Merin Hcper, ( 1985 ), pp· 133. 
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political parties had been interned at the same time. Demirel and Ecevit's 
internment at Gallipoli ended on 11 October 1980 and were set free. 
However, NAP was accused for having been involved in organised violence 
and A.Türkeş and members of the party were tried on a number of charges. 
NSP was accused of illegally subverting the secular nature of the Republic; 
massive trials were held but Erbakan was released on the condition of 
waiting trial.
While Demirel remained out of the political stage, waiting for 
the transition to civilian politics, Ecevit resigned from the chairmanship of 
RPP on October 30, 1980 and returned as the editor of " Arayış " 
( "Search"), writing articles full of criticisms for the military regime of 1980. 
In November 1981, he was sentenced to four months imprisonment under 
the decree issued on June 2 , 1981, which stipulated that " former politicians 
are forbidden to make any statements about the past or future political or 
legal system of Turkey Ecevit was rearrested twice in 1982 for
statements he gave to various foreign newspapers and broadcasting 
organisations. Furthermore, a ban on the old political leaders re-entering 
politics was formally issued in October 1982, when Provisional Article 4 of 
the new Constitution stated that " the chairmen, general secretaries and 
other senior office holders in the former poUtical parties could not join or 
have any kind of relations with future political parties, or run for elections 
( even as independents ) for the next ten years
’ ■ -Merin Heper, ( 1985 ), pp. 134. 
>'3 William Hale, ( 1994 ), pp. 262. 
’ '"’Ibid., pp. 260.
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The military was also supersensitive on the issue of 
politicisation of the bureaucratic intelligentsia. Having in mind the creation 
of a bureaucracy carrying the double features of a machine body and the 
Weberian legal-rational character, a close hierarchical control of the body 
was attained through the establishment of a High Board of Supervision, 
affiliated to the office of the President. From September 1980 to 
September 1981 a total of 18,000 civil servants were either taken into 
custody, or formally arrested, or convicted. Also, there were signs that 
large-scale purges were in prospect for civil bureaucrats, whose previous 
appointments had been carrying political connotations.
The military also took action against the Council of State. 
Constraints were not only imposed on the general jurisdiction of the 
Council- an appeal could no longer be made to the Council of State against 
decrees signed by three ministers or more- but also on its internal 
autonomy, by the empowerment of the President to appoint all the 
important members of the Council.
The Higher Education Council ( Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu ), set 
up on 6  November 1981, was an attempt by the military to control and 
restrict the autonomy of the universities, which had been the most 
politically activated sectors of Turkish society during the 1 9 7 0 s . B o t h  
students and staff of universities were forbidden to join political parties. The 
Council was also the supervisor of the administration of the universities, 
including such areas as staffing and admissions. In 1982 about three
Heper, ( 1985 ), pp. 139.
'■ % id .,pp . 138.
‘ '3bid .,pp . 138.
>'T :. H. Dodd, ( 1983 ), pp. 48-49.
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hundred academics were dismissed ; the wave of dismissals continued also in 
1983, but their justification was hard to be maded^*^
Other measures taken by the military were the constraint of the 
mass media and the censorship imposed on them; the 24 January economic 
package was put into effect with Turgut Ozal as its leading figure; and a 
series of trials had begun for the leaders and the members of such 
organisations as the Dev-Sol, TOB-DER, Dev-Yol, the Turkish Workers 
and Peasants Party, and the Apoistsd^^
In 1981, the military appointed a Consultative Assembly for 
devising a new constitution and a new electoral law. In a referendum, held 
in November 1982, the new document was submitted to the people with a 
compulsory participation, which resulted in its approval by an 
overwhelming 91 percent. The new electoral law aimed at the creation of 
new political parties, which will prepare the path for a smooth transition to 
civilian politics once more.
E. THE 1982 CONSTITUTION
When the military intervened on 12 September 1980, there 
were no plans for an indefinite period of rule. The aim of the military was to 
replace the malfunctioning democracy of the prc'1980 period with a 
completely new democratic system, which would leave no space for bad 
politicians and for the degeneration of the political system. As in previous 
military interventions, there was the belief that crisis situation of the past
' pp.  49.
H. Dodd, (1983), pp. 46-47.
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was the combination of the inability of the politicians and the inadequacy 
of the Constitution. Thus, there was again the minimisation of a 
problematic situation on the legal level and the effort to find the remedy 
with the construction of a completely new constitution. This would be the 
guarantee for the withdrawal of the military from the political scene of the 
country.
On 30 June 1981 a Constituent Assembly was established, 
having the responsibilities of preparing a new constitution, electoral law, 
and political parties law, as well as to perform normal legislative functions 
such as making, amending or repealing laws.'s^ This Assembly consisted of 
two bodies: the Consultative Assembly ( convened in October 1981 ) and 
the National Security Council. The Consultative Assembly shared 
legislative powers with the NSC, but the N SC had the final say in the 
making of the Constitution, as well as the rejection or amendment of other 
legislative bills passed by the Consultative Assembly.’®’
The context within which the new constitution was prepared, 
including such dimensions as the dynamics of the constitution, the form of 
its preparation and its sources, is a good point of departure for analysing the 
military's notion of democracy and the system that they wished to establish 
for the good of the nation.
If the making of a democratic constitution necessitates the 
existence of a liberal and pluralistic society and the regime of public 
opinion, the free activation of political parties, an elected Constituent
Özbudun, ( 1987 ), pp. 31.
pp. 31,· William Hale, ( 1994 ), pp. 256,· Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren'in Anılan ,( İstanbul, 
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Assembly which will reflect the free will of a liberal and pluralistic society, 
and the approval of the constitution by a referendum, the making of the 
1982 Constitution had been implemented in a completely different 
context.’®^
After the 1980 military intervention, the parliament and the 
government were dissolved; political parties were abolished; and the N SC 
took the responsibility of ruling the country. The 160 members of the 
Consultative Assembly were directly or indirectly chosen by the NSC. 
Although this assembly would prepare the draft of the new Constitution, 
the final version of it would be approved by the NSC. The constitution was 
ratified by a popular vote in a referendum, while the NSC still governed the 
country. Therefore, the preparation and approval of the 1982 Constitution 
had been implemented in a political environment far beyond any notion of 
democracy.
Furthermore, the Consultative and Constituent Assembly had 
no relation with the legal notion of " being an assembly " . The members of 
the Consultative Assembly had not been elected by the people, but rather 
chosen by the N SC or nominated by governors, who had themselves been 
appointed by the military. Therefore, whether the Consultative Assembly is 
the " legitimate representative of the Turkish nation"- as stipulated in the 
preamble of the Constitution- , or not is a good question to be asked.
Also, whether the Consultative Assembly is the representative 
of the Turkish nation, or not, can be approached by analysing its social, 
ideological, political and class composition. Bülent Tanör characterised the
’^Tûlent Tanör, ( 1994 ), pp· 99-100.
87
Consultative Assembly as being "...a body with no affiliation to political 
parties and organisations; and a club or political body of some old, 
conservative and very atomised intellectuals with no relation to the House 
of Representatives of 1960-61...".'S'* It was not only the abolishment of the 
political parties that made impossible any relationship of the Assembly with 
parties; the Assembly had also no representatives coming from the media, 
the universities, trade unions, associations, etc. The members were old-aged 
and with high educational background; an important barrier for the 
representation of the young or the working classes. Thus, the connotation 
of being " the legitimate representatives of the Turkish nation " is rather 
problematic.
The military had also forbidden any discussions concerning the 
new constitution during the period of its preparation, under the fear that 
this would be a way of influencing the people before the referendum. 
However, the military continued this prohibition of discussions even during 
the period of the presentation of the new constitution in the media and the 
visits of K.Evren in various parts of the country. This was certainly not a 
very democratic environment for a " democratic " constitution.'®^
The referendum of 7 November 1982 and the affirmative votes 
of over % 91 of the voting electorate is another point for discussion. The 
NSC had made no announcements concerning the date of the general 
elections or what would have been done if the constitution had not been 
ratified by the people. Thus, the high votes of the referendum can be
'®^Ibid.,pp. 104. 
'®=lbid.,pp. 107.
8 8
explained as the reaction of the electorate to the uncertainty of the N SC 
and the expectation to an early return to civilian politics.'®'^
According to the Provisional Article 1, "...on the proclamation, 
under lawful procedure, of the adoption by referendum of the Constitution 
as the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, the Chairman of the Council 
of National Security and Head of State at the time of the referendum, shall 
assume the title of the President of the Republic and shall exercise the 
constitutional powers and functions of the President of the Republic for a 
period of seven years....". Also, the electorate's participation to the 
referendum had been guaranteed and became an obligation under the 
punishments stipulated in the Provisional Article 16. Therefore, the high 
percentage of the electorate's vote was the result of a confusion on the votes 
of the referendum and the plebiscite votes . Bülent Tanör argues that 
"...the Constitution was the prestige of K.Evren, and the will of the people 
for a transition to civilian poUtics - whatever the price for this would be- 
was a very possible reason for providing Evren a high percentage of 
votes...".
The paradox of preparing a " democratic " constitution under 
non-democratic conditions can also be observed in the analysis of the 
sources used in the implementation of the new text. These sources can be 
put into three categories: first, the 1961 Constitution under the form of the 
197T73 constitutional amendments; second, the laws passed by the N SC ; 
and third, the European Human Rights Agreement ( Avrupa İnsan Hakları 
Sözleşmesi ). What was a critical point in the formation of a " democratic "
'8%id., pp. 105Ü06.
pp. 106.
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constitution was the fact that the laws passed by the NSC were infiltrated in 
the new text as constitutional articles, concerning important areas of the 
Turkish political life. Also, the formulation of the new constitution and the 
various laws concerning the structure of the future political life had been 
implemented under the supervision of the N SC, without waiting the 
transition to civilian politics. Furthermore, in order to guarantee the 
products of their intervention-that is to say,, the structure of a democratic 
political system a-la military- Provisional Article 15 stipulated that "....no 
allegation of unconstitutionality shall be made in respect of decisions or 
measures taken under laws or decrees having force of law enacted during 
this period or under Act No: 2324 on the Constitutional Order...".
What I tried to do with the analysis of the context of the 
preparation of the 1982 Constitution is to show that the connotation of 
being " democratic " is connected not only with the content of a 
constitution, but also with the general dynamics during the preparation of 
the text. If the military tried to formulate a " democratic " constitution 
under undemocratic conditions, the content of this text surely reflects this 
paradoxical situation. In other words, the notion of democracy for the 
military in 1980 had a special essence; an essence that may be contradictory 
with what civilians of all kind think of democracy. Actually, I argue that 
1982 Constitution was the expression of the military's historical background 
of state elitism and their obsession with the concept of " rationalist 
democracy " : a democracy under the leadership of the state elites who 
would prepare the people's elevation to the standards of Western 
Civilisation.
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The makers of the 1982 Constitution reacted to the excessive 
permissiveness of the 1961 Constitution and its excessive limitations on the 
exercise of the executive authority, which were supposed to be the blamers 
for the crisis situation of the 1970s.'®® In order to prevent a future erosion of 
the state authority, the framers aimed at the creation of a " strong state and 
a strong executive ".
Another major feature of the 1982 Constitution is its provision 
for a relatively long period of transition to complete normalcy.'®^ Provisional 
Article 9 stipulates that "....Within a period of six years following the 
formation of the Bureau of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey w'hich 
is to convene after the first general elections, the President of the Republic 
may refer to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey for further 
consideration any Constitutional amendments adopted by the Assembly. In 
this case the re-submission of the Constitutional amendment draft in its 
unchanged form to the President of the Republic by the GNA of Turkey, is 
only possible with a three fourths majority of the votes of the total number 
of members." Actually, this was nothing but the expression of the fact that 
the military had come as real professionals and were very careful not to 
repeat the mistakes of their counterparts in the past; a transition to civilian 
politics would be under their control until they were sure that their 
expectations for the future had taken the form of reality.
Their aim for a complete new political system was further 
reinforced by the ban imposed on the political activities of the former
'®®Ergun Ozbudun, ( 1987 ), pp· 32. 
'®°lbid., pp. 33.
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" malfunctioning " politicians. According to the Provisional Article 4, 
there was the imposition of two different kind of bans on the political 
activities of members of the executive branch of political parties, deputies 
and senators , for a period of five to ten years. The abolition of all pre-lPSO 
political parties, the new Political Parties Law and the new Electoral Law 
were some of the guarantees for the prevention of the malfunctioning 
democracy of the 1970s.
As the 1982 Constitution is the reaction to the 1961 
Constitution' the constitutional tradition of Turkey- , the new constitution 
was much longer than the 1961 one. There were 177 articles and 16 
provisional articles, while the 1961 Constitution consisted of 157 articles 
and 11 transitional articles. Every article of the 1982 Constitution was 
longer than the articles of the 1961 Constitution. Therefore, the 1982 
Constitution has a more legalistic ( kanuncu ) character than the 1961 
Constitution: the framers of the new constitution believed, as in the past, 
that every political and social problem has a legal solution and remedy. 
However, the obsession of the makers of the constitution in trying to 
formulate every area of the social and political life in its smallest detail was a 
disadvantage of both the 1961 and 1982 Constitution. It was obvious that 
both framers of the constitutions had forgotten the dimension of social 
change and the danger of the constitution to fall in a situation where 
adaptability with the current wave would be impossible. As Ergun Ozbudun 
points out : "...A very detailed and strict constitution, which aims at a
"''^Ergun Ozbudun, ( 1993 ), pp- 38. 
’ ’^ Ibid., pp. 36.
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stable political system, faces the danger of continuous criticisms that may 
lead to political instability..
The 1982 Constitution was very strict in character; actually this 
specific feature was much more profound than in the 1961 Constitution. 
Provisions stipulating the impossibility of change of the Constitution and 
the number of decrees and statutes that cannot be changed has increased. 
Also, the President has the power to submit proposed constitutional 
amendments to popular referendum ( Art. 104 ). The provisional articles 9 
( during the six-year transitional period, the right of the President to veto 
constitutional amendments passed by the TGNA, in which case the 
Assembly can override the veto only by a three-fourths majority of its full 
membership ) and 15 ( no allegation of unconstitutionality for the decrees 
having the force of law passed by the NSC ) were also examples of the strict 
character of the 1982 Constitution.
As a reaction to the excessive limitations imposed on the 
executive power in the 1961 Constitution, the 1982 Constitution created a 
strong executive. The 1961 Constitution had stipulated that the executive is 
a function of the state within the legal context of the country. However, 
Art. 8 of the 1982 Constitution states that " executive power and function 
shall be carried out by the President of the Republic and the Council of 
Ministers in conformity with the Constitution and the laws.".
If the 1961 Constitution declared the supremacy of the 
Constitution and the independence of the judiciary, the 1982 Constitution 
was for the Supremacy of the executive and the loosening of the legislature.
pp. 36. 
pp. 37.
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Thus, the executive's " regulative power " ( yürütme organının düzenleme 
yetkisi ) further empowered the executive to issue " law-amending 
ordinances " ( kanun-hükmünde kararname According to Art. 91 
"...the Grand National Assembly of Turkey may empower the Council of 
Ministers to issue decrees having force of law. The fundamental rights, 
individuals rights and duties included in the First and Second Part of the 
Constitution and the political rights and duties listed in the Fourth Chapter, 
cannot be regulated by degrees having force of law except during periods of 
martial law and states of emergency....". Art. 92 also expresses the increased 
empowerment of the executive- especially the President- while it stipulates 
that "...If the country is subjected, while the Grand National Assembly of 
Turkey is adjourned or in recess, to sudden armed aggression and thus it 
becomes imperative to decide immediately on the use of armed forces, the 
President of the RepubUc can decide on the use of the Turkish Armed 
Forces..".
Another point which shows the strengthening of the executive 
and the loosening of the legislature is the power of the President to call new 
elections for the Turkish Grand National Assembly ( art. 116 ). Actually, 
the detailed list of powers of the President of the Republic in Art. 104- 
especially the part relating to the legislation ( Art. 104/a )- is nothing else 
but the strengthening of the executive in the cost of the decreasing powers 
of the legislature. However, this strengthening is based on a delicate balance 
between the President and Council of Ministers. Although the President is 
empowered with an impressive list of powers, the President can exercise
^^ ■ E^rgun Özbudun, ( J987 ), pp· 54.
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them only upon the proposals or prior action of the Prime Minister alone or 
with the ministers concerned. The acts of the President alone are excluded 
from judicial review, including the Constitutional Court's review.
Some of the powers of the President of the Republic are ; 
appointing the members of the Constitutional Court, one-fourth of the 
members of the Council of State, the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court 
of Cassation and his deputy, the members of the Supreme Military 
Administrative C ou rt, the Military Court of Cassation and the members of 
the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors ( Art. 104/c ).
Also, the President appoints the Prime Minister and accepts his 
resignation; appoints and dismisses other ministers on the proposal of the 
Prime Minister; represents the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Turkish armed forces on behalf of the TGNA; signs governmental decrees; 
calls the NSC to meeting and presides over it; proclaims martial law or a 
state of emergency in collaboration with the Council of Ministers which 
meets under his chairmanship; appoints the chairman and the members of 
the State Supervisory Council and instructs it to carry out investigations 
and inspections ( Art. 104/ b ).
The strengthening of the executive can also be seen from the 
perspective of centralisation'“'^ . The establishment of the Higher Education 
Council ( YOK ) in 1981 was an important factor in the abolishment of the 
universities' autonomy, which had been restricted by the 197T73 
amendments. The elimination of the administrative autonomy of the 
universities is stipulated in Art. 130, where it is stated that the President
‘ °^lbid.,pp. 51,
'^^Bülent Tanôr, ( 1994 ), pp. 12 J.
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appoints the university rectors, and the Higher Education Council appoints 
the faculty deans, "in accordance with the procedures and provisions of the 
law."
Centralisation was also reinforced by the increased 
administrative trusteeship of the central administration over the local 
governments ( Art. 127 )·
Another important departure from the 1961 Constitution is the 
loosening of power of the judiciary in the 1982 Constitution. The 
independence of the judiciary had been affected in a serious degree by the 
powers of the President pertaining the judicial function. According to Art. 
104/c , the President appoints the members of the most important judicial 
organs of the country. The President of the Supreme Council of Judges and 
Public Prosecutors is the Minister of Justice ( Art. 159 ). Judges and public 
prosecutors were united under the same status ( Art. 139, 140 ) and were 
both responsible to the same ministry, as far as their administrative duties 
are concerned.
Judicial review had also showed a loosening of power. 
According to Article 125, "...The acts of the President of the republic in 
his own competence and the decisions of the Supreme Military Council are 
outside the scope of judicial review. Judicial power is Limited to the 
verification of the conformity of the actions and acts of the administration 
with law. No judicial ruling shall be passed which restricts the exercise of 
the executive function in accordance with the forms and principles
pp. 117.
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prescribed by law, which has the quality of an administrative action and 
act, or which removes discretionary powers."
Furthermore, the loosening of judicial review was also present 
in the suits of unconstitutionality. Law-amending ordinances issued during 
periods of martial law or state of emergency are outside the scope of the 
review of constitutionality by the Constitutional Court( Arts. 91, 121, 122, 
148 ). According to Provisional Article 15 , no allegation of
unconstitutionality could be made in respect of decisions or measures taken 
under laws or decrees having force of law enacted during the rule of the 
NSC. Certain limitations were imposed upon the Constitutional Court, as 
Art. 153/2 stipulates that "...in the course of annulling the whole or a 
provision of laws or decrees having force of law, the Constitutional Court 
shall not act as a law-maker and pass judgement leading to new 
implementation." The Constitutional Court cannot also review a 
constitutional amendment on substantive grounds ( Art. 150 ).
The loosening of the judiciary was also evident by the 
provisions concerning the ability of the other courts. Therefore, according 
to Art. 152/4 "...no allegation of unconstitutionality shall be made with 
regard to the same legal provision until ten years elapse after the publication 
in the Official Gazette of the decision of the Constitutional Court dismissing 
the application on its merits ". In addition, principal proceedings ( iptal 
davası ) could not be instituted by the Military Court of Cassation, the 
Council of State, the Court of Cassation, the Supreme Court of Judges and 
the universities'“®. In the 1982 Constitution, principal proceedings could be
pp. 118.
97
instituted by the President, parliamentary groups of the government party 
and the main opposition party, or at least one-fifth of the full membership 
of the Assembly ( Art. 150 ). According to Art. 151, suits of 
unconstitutionality must be initiated within sixty days following the 
promulgation of the law in the official Gazette.
Another important area of analysis in the 1982 Constitution 
would be the relationship between the civilian powers and the military and 
how it is stipulated in the Constitution. The fact that the military had 
intervened for a short period of time and a transition to civilian politics was 
going to be implemented, the military had to provide some guarantees for 
its autonomy or even its future influence in the political scene, as the 1960 
military had started this tradition of exit guarantees.
The first important area of analysis is the status of the National 
Security Council. According to Art. 118, the N SC is a mixed body of 
civilians and politicians; it is composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of 
the General Staff, the Minister of Defence, Internal Affairs, and Foreign 
Affairs, the Commanders of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force and the 
General Commander of the Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of the 
President of the Republic. In the 1961 Constitution, the appointment of the 
civilians in the N SC were under the jurisdiction of the judiciary; therefore, 
the civilian were a numerical m a j o r i t y . T h e  numerical equality between 
the military and the civilians in the NSC under the 1982 Constitution 
actually covered in a delicate way the numerical majority of the military, 
since the President used to have a military background.
^^ ""Ergun Ôzbudun, ( 1987 ), pp. 58. 
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As the same article states, " ...The National Security Council 
shall submit to the Council of Ministers its views on taking decisions and 
ensuring necessary co'ordination with regard to the formulation, 
establishment and implementation of the National Security policy of the 
State. The Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the 
decisions of the NSC concerning the measures that it deems necessary for 
the preservation of the existence and independence of the State, the 
integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of 
society...". The second important difference between the 1961 and 1982 
Constitution lay on the function of the NSC. In the 1961 Constitution, the 
NSC provided advice to the Council of Ministers; after the 197T73 
amendments, the same body provided recommendations; finally, their 
powers were increased in the 1982 Constitution, where the Council of 
Ministers should give priority consideration to the decisions of the NSC.
The notion of " national security " was also broadened; it was 
not only the preservation of the integrity and indivisibility of the country, 
but also the internal peace and security of the society . Thus, the military 
had broadened its sphere of influence in a considerable degree.
Under the new Constitution, the declaration of martial law had 
been much easier than in the 1961 Constitution. Decrees having the force 
of law issued during the period of martial law are kept out of the allegation 
of unconstitutionality ( Prov. Art. 15 ). Also the Commanders of Martial 
Law exercise their duties under the authority of the Office of the Chief of 
the General Staff ( Art. 122 ), while in the 1961 Constitution were under
9 9
the authority of the Prime Minister. This was an important gain for the 
preservation of the autonomy of the military.
Another important innovation of the 1982 Constitution, 
which played a crucial role in the structure of the relationship of civilians 
and the military, was the power given to the President to decide to use the 
Turkish Armed Forces ( Art. 104/b ). According to Art. 92, "....if the 
country is subjected, while the TGNA is adjourned or in recess, to sudden 
armed aggression,....the President can decide to use the Armed Forces...". 
The importance of this power lies on the fact that one of the minimal 
qualifications needed for the nomination of a candidate for the Presidency 
was indirectly implied to be the military background of the candidate. 
Bülent Tanör further argues that the impressive lists of powers of the 
President in the 1982 could have been deliberately introduced by the 
military, having in mind that all ( except one ) Presidents had a military 
background; the abolishment of the Senate had created a space which was 
possible to be occupied by a candidate not only within the TGNA, but also 
from outside the Parliament; or, according to the provision of a 
nomination from outside the parliament, the Chief of General Staff could 
be planned to be a candidate for the Presidency.’®'
In addition to all these, the transitional period of six years 
under the supervision of the NSC , the veto power of the President for 
unchanged proposals of constitutional amendments with the requirement of 
at least three-fourth of the full membership of the Assembly ( Prov. Art. 9 ) 
were important factors that made possible to believe not only to the
''®’lbid., pp. 124.
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supremacy of the State and the Executive, but also to the shift of balance 
towards the part of the military in their relations to the civilian power of the 
country in the future.
Another problematic area of the 1982 Constitution, which had 
been under the burden of high criticisms, is the provisions concerning 
human rights and liberties. Being a reaction to the excessive permissiveness 
of the 1961 Constitution, the 1982 Constitution recognises all basic human 
rights commonly found in liberal democratic constitutions on the basis of 
being more restrictive on the manner which these rights are regulated. 
However, the numerous and explicitly stated circumstances of restrictions 
create a situation of confusion and uncertainty.
According to Art. 13, "...Fundamental rights and freedoms 
may be restricted by law, in conformity with the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution, with the aim of safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the 
State with its territory and nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, 
national security, public order, general peace, the public interest, public 
morals and public health.....General and specific grounds for restrictions of 
fundamental rights and freedoms shall not conflict with the requirements of 
the democratic order of society and shall not be imposed for any purpose 
other than those for which they are prescribed..". As we can see, the 
restriction area had been kept very wide and unspecified. In addition to 
this, the fundamental principle of the 1961 Constitution that " no law shall 
infringe upon the " essence" of any right or liberty " has been dropped. 
Thus, the strict and hard-line character of the Constitution was reinforced.
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A very problematic and confusing area of Constitutional Law, 
concerning the protection and restrictions imposed on fundamental rights 
and liberties, is the relationship between Art. 121, 122, 15 and 148. 
According to Art. 15, ".... In times of war, mobilisation, martial law, or 
state of emergency, the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms can be 
partially or entirely suspended, or measure may be taken, to the extent 
required by the exigencies of the situation, which derogate the guarantees 
embodied in the Constitution, provided that obligations under international 
law are not violated. Even under the circumstances indicated above, the 
individual's right to life, and the integrity of his material and spiritual entity 
shall be inviolable except where death occurs through lawful acts of warfare 
and execution of death sentences; no one may be compelled to reveal his 
religion, conscience, thought or opinion, nor be accused on account of 
them; offences and penalties may not be retroactive, not may anyone be 
held guilty until so proven by a court judgement Beside a broad 
restriction imposed on fundamental rights and liberties under martial law or 
state of emergency, the Constitution clearly states in the same article the 
inviolability of a core area of human rights . However, this inviolability may 
be restricted-®- in fundamental ways under Art. 148, which stipulates that 
"...no action shall be brought before the Constitutional Court alleging the 
unconstitutionality as to the form or substance of degrees having force of 
law, issued during a state of emergency, martial law, or in time of law...". 
Article 121 and 122 state that any restrictions imposed on fundamental 
rights and freedoms in a state of emergency or martial law shall be regulated
202Ergun Özbudun, ( 1987 ), pp. 38.
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by law. However, the discretionary powers given to the legislature in both 
articles are limited under Art. 15/1.
Another major field of criticism arose from a number of new 
laws enacted by the military regime. The Trades Union Law, and the Law 
on Collective Labour Agreements, Strikes and Lockouts, both issued in 
March 1983, were difficult to be reconcile with a democratic political 
system. The ban on the political activities of the unions and the declaration 
of strikes with " political objectives " as illegal were both the expression of 
the military's opposition to anything affiliating to Marxism and reflected the 
" solidarist vision of the state
The broad and unspecified restrictions imposed upon 
fundamental rights and liberties could be best understood in the light of 
understanding the notion of liberal democracy and human rights and 
liberties as presented in the Preamble of the Constitution. Human rights are 
understood and exercised in the way that they are " set forth in the 
Constitution, in conformity with the requirements of equality and social 
justice", but they are " sculptured " in harmony with the will of the 
military for a rationalist democracy and a completely new basis for Turkish 
society. The global project of the 1982 Constitution involves "...the 
recognition of the absolute supremacy of the will of the nation, and of the 
fact that sovereignty is vested fully and unconditionally in the Turkish 
Nation and that no individual or body empowered to exercise it on behalf 
of the nation shall deviate from democracy based on freedom, as set forth in 
the Constitution and the rule of law instituted according to its
pp. 37.
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requirements..."( Preamble/ 3rd paragraph ). Also, special emphasis is given 
to such concepts as national culture, Turkish historical and moral values, 
nationalism, reforms and modernism of Ataturk, secularism, civilisation, 
equality, social justice, rule of law which actually serve in the structure of a 
subjective view of nation: "...the recognition that all Turkish citizens are 
united in national honour and pride, in national joy and grief, in their 
rights and duties towards their existence as a nation, in blessings and in 
burdens, and in every manifestation of the national life, and that they have 
the right to demand a peaceful life based on absolute respect for one 
another's rights and freedoms, mutual love and fellowship, and the desire 
for, and behef in, " Peace at home, peace in the world.." ( Preamble/ last 
paragraph ). Therefore, the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals 
were made the indispensable elements of a global projection of the Turkish 
nation and State, where the preservation of the integrity and 
indispensability of the nation and the protection of the autonomy of the 
State had been the most fundamental prerequisite for the exercise and 
sometimes, excessive restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms.
However, whether the 1982 Constitution was a " democratic " 
constitution prepared under undemocratic conditions or not, there were 
some important improvements, worth to be mentioned. First, the 
abolishment of the Senate introduced unicameralism , with the 400 
members of the Grand National Assembly, having an increased term of five 
years. Second, under Article 116, the President was given the power to call 
for new elections if the government lost a vote of confidence, and no 
accepted successor could be formed within forty-five days. This would
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possibly avoid the chaotic situation of the past, in which the Assembly 
frequently voted a government out of office but could not then agree to 
vote for early elections. The system of electing a President was also altered; 
the term office was for seven years and there could not be re-election. This 
was a measure which would probably altered the presidential election crisis 
of the past.
The elections of 1983 were a turning point in the civilian-army 
relations. With three competing political parties in the scene- the MP of 
T.Ozal being opposed by the military and the Nationalist Democracy Party 
being strongly and even personally supported by the President- the 
formation of a majority government of 211 seats out of 400 by the MP was 
the point of departure for a new era of civilian politics and of the role of the 
military in Turkish politics.
F. BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM
The emergence in the 1960s and 1970s of a wave of military 
interventions in the most advanced and prosperous states of Latin America 
was a phenomenon which introduced considerable debate, challenging 
received ideas and the birth to fresh theoretical perspectives. This particular 
resurgence of military regimes in Latin America came to challenge the 
earlier hypothesis of the developmental literature that suggested a positive 
association between socio-economic modernisation and democracy.
An attempt to understand and analyse the new form of 
authoritarianism in Latin America- especially the military governments of
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Brazil (1964) and Argentina (1966)- was made by the Argentine political 
scientist Guillermo O'Donnell with his work Modernisation and 
Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (1973). By offering an economic 
explanation, he identified the roots of bureaucratic authoritarianism in the 
exhaustion of the program of " Import Substitution Industrialisation " and 
the severe economic and political crises following.
To some extent, Turkey shows some resemblance to Latin 
America. In the late 1970s Turkey had fallen victim to a combination of 
political and economic crises. The September 12, 1980 military intervention 
had come to power under strikingly similar conditions to those experienced 
by Brazil in 1964, by Argentina in 1966 and 1976, and by Chile and 
Uruguay in 1973. The implementation of the bureaucratic authoritarian 
state was coupled with the intention of the military to stay in power for 
some time longer and to introduce fundamental changes coupled with the 
use of violence.
O'Donnell pointed out that the populist coalitions of the 1930s 
in both Brazil and Argentina had concentrated their economic policies and 
developmental programs on " Import-Substitution IndustriaUsation " . 
These coalitions seemed to be successful in both countries as high levels of 
industrialisation were achieved, with a consequence of high profits for both 
the industrialists and the urban working class. However, an eventual 
economic stagnation is inherent in ISl. After the exhaustion of the easy 
stage of ISI , a crisis situation was evident in those countries. Rising 
inflation and balance-of-payments difficulties undermined the economic 
gains made by the urban middle and working classes, and hence, it eroded
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the viability of the populist coalitions on which these regimes were based. 
Attributing the crisis to the threat of political activation within the popular 
sectors ( which continued to press for improvements in their living 
standards), technocrats in both countries encouraged and supported 
military coups.
The new regimes, rather than attempting to reincorporate the 
popular sectors, moved to exclude and deactivate them by instituting a 
repressive brand of authoritarianism and to reorient the political economy 
according to technocratic conceptions of economic growth. These 
conceptions included a deepening of industrialisation through the domestic 
manufacture of consumer durables and intermediate and capital goods, 
which required larger, more efficient, and highly capitalised enterprises- 
often the affiliates of multinational corporations.
In Turkey, ISI was a policy activated in the 1950s and earlier. 
The economic policy was not for the internationalisation of the market, but 
for high protection through such measures as quotas for imports, state 
control and, investment incentives. The concentration on production for 
the domestic market gave to the populist governments the support of the 
industrialists and the urban poor. The oil shock of 1973, however, caused a 
foreign exchange crisis in Turkey. The end of both the ISI and the populist 
coalitions was obvious. The necessary move was a trend towards 
internationalisation and an export-oriented market. This move was made 
by the military on 12 September 1980. The Turkish army had come to 
provide for a remedy to the " bad job of the politicians " : a political 
paralysis characterised by violence in the streets, terrorism, polarisation.
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fragmentation and degeneration of the whole political system; and an 
economic crisis, manifested itself in high inflation rates, balance-of-payment 
difficulties, and shortages of foreign currency and basic goods. *^^^
According to Guillermo O'Donnell, the BA is a type of 
authoritarian state, whose principal characteristics are:^^^
1. It is the aspect of global society that guarantees and organises the 
domination exercised through a class structure subordinated to the upper 
fractions of a highly oligopolised and transnationalised bourgeoisie.
2. It corresponds to and promotes an increasing transnationalisation of 
production.
3. Its institutions comprise organisations in which specialists in coercion as 
well as those whose aim is to achieve the " normalisation " of the economy 
have a decisive weight.
4. It suppresses the institutions of popular democracy, and closes democratic 
channels to access to government. It involves closing the channels for the 
representation of the popular and working interests. Access is limited to 
those who stand at the apex of the large organisations, especially the armed 
forces, large enterprises, and certain segments of the state's civil 
bureaucracy.
5. It endeavours to depoliticise social issues by dealing with them in terms 
of the supposedly neutral and objective criteria of technical rationality.
6. The BA is based on the suppression of two fundamental mediations 
between state and society: citizenship and pueblo. The suppression of the
“'^^Henri Barkey (a), " Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils to Transition ”, in Armed Forces and 
Society , 16:2, Winter 1990, pp. 177.
^^^Guillermo O ’Donnell, Bureaucratic Authoritarianism :Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative 
Perspective , ( Berkeley, Los Angeles , London: University of California Press, 1988 ), pp. 3L32.
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institutional roles and channels of access to the government characteristic of 
political democracy is aimed at the elimination of the roles ( pueblo ) and 
organisations ( political parties among them ) that once served as channels 
for the appeals for substantive justice.
7. It is a system of political exclusion of a previously activated popular 
sector, which is subjected to strict controls designed to eliminate its earlier 
presence in the political arena. This is achieved by coercion, as well as by 
the destruction or strict governmental control of the resources ( especially 
those embodied in class organisations and political parties or movements ) 
that sustained this activation. Such exclusion is guided by the determination 
to impose order on society and to ensure its future viability....".
Therefore, the military in both Latin America and Turkey took 
the role of the " guardian " of the national interest in quite similar 
conditions. As both regimes accused the " bad job of the politicians " , the 
bureaucratic authoritarianism in Turkey and Latin America followed an 
oppressive and exclusionist program. The restoration of the order in those 
countries might have different character in the way the policies for 
achieving their aim were planned. But these differences did not erase the 
trademark of the BA state in none of them.
However, some fundamental differences can be identified. 
Unlike the case of Argentina, while the military in power excluded their 
opponents from the political stage, human rights violations in Turkey did 
not reach the level of any Latin American case. Also, the Turkish army had 
to perform an internal as well as external role. Being an ally to NATO and 
other international organisations, and having a problematic relationship
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with hei‘ neighbours was a catalyst for moderating the army's behaviour.207 
This was actually an influential factor for the short duration of the military 
regime in Turkey, while in Latin America the army had come for a much 
longer period of time.
Although the Turkish military followed the exclusionist 
political program of deactivating the popular sectors of the Turkish society 
and making fundamental changes in the formation of a new Constitution, 
the economic policies of the military did not fit much to the BA model of 
O'Donnell. The economics of the new order set out to continue the January 
24, 1980 economic liberalisation program of the last civilian government of 
Demirel. The father of the radical and far-reaching economic program- 
Turgut Ozal- was appointed to the cabinet; he was actually the only pre- 
1980 governmental member and technocrat to be retained in the new 
regime. The January 24, 1980 economic package was the shift from the ISI 
policies to a more dynamic and open system. The export-orientation of the 
new regime did quite well in such areas as foreign trade, export performance 
and the GDP.
However, there was a high cost for this. As Barkey writes: 
"...this transformation has exacted a price; it has come at the expense of 
further indebtedness and consistently declining real wage rates. The 
Turkish foreign debt increased by 2.5 times since 1980. Even more 
alarming for Turkey had been the changing nature of the foreign debt as 
short-term debt, which had been reduced from 25 percent of the total in 
1979, to 15 percent in 1980, and then to 10 percent in 1982, starting to rise
-0· Henri Barkey, ( 1990a ), pp. 177.
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in 1984 and reaching almost 23 percent in 1987. In the long run, and 
especially in view of the problems faced by the large debtor nations of Latin 
America, the over-dependence on short term financing can potentially lead 
to crises of confidence, crises characteristic of the 1970s. Moreover, the 
decline in real wages since 1979- by almost 30 to 50 percent for private and 
public sectors employees- had not been accompanied by significant 
improvements in the unemployment picture...
Therefore, rather than following the deepening policy- as 
expected from O'Donnell- Turkey did not give any priority and did not 
materialise this policy at all. Rather than putting emphasis in the vertical 
integration of the industrial sector through an increase in state and/or 
international capital investments in heavy industríeseos, they followed 
traditional orthodox economic remedies which mainly supported the export 
sector.
Although Turkey made an important move towards increasing 
the autonomy of the state for preventing crises, the deepening proposition 
was not implemented and the country's economy did a little step towards 
austerity; a step with important and dangerous implications for the future. If 
the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes came because of the exhaustion of 
the easy stage of ISI, and if they intended to follow different economic 
policies for establishing a new order, why didn't the military perform a line 
of success ? And why didn't the Turkish military implement the deepening 
proposition of O'Donnell, if this was the remedy to the economy of the
208]bid.,pp. 185d86. 
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country ? How necessary was the military interv’ention ? Was it an 
inevitable step after the exhaustion of ISI ?
Albert Hirschman raised the question of whether ISI's 
shortcomings are due to its inherent tendency towards exhaustion. 
Hirschman argues that ISI's exhaustion is not an inherent tendency of the 
policy in itself, but rather policies and policy makers were to be blamed for 
bringing the exhaustion of the ISI. For Hirschman, "...a transition to greater 
economic orthodoxy- which may have eliminated the need for a BA coup- 
requires the action and the leadership on the part of either industrialists, 
who in the long run stand to benefit the most from the change, and/or state 
a u t h o r i t i e s . . . T h e r e f o r e ,  the decline and exhaustion of import- 
substitution is the result of a complex political process.
Henri Barkey also points out that ISI fails for political and not 
economic reasons. For Barkey, the protectionist policies of ISI have a 
paradoxical outcome of both economy-wide distortions and " economic 
rents " ( benefits ) for those involved in the LSI. While it is necessary to 
eliminate these rents, the beneficiaries are not only reluctant to give them 
up, but are also determined to organise themselves for fighting in order to 
preserve and maximise them. Thus, "...the state finds itself trapped among 
the different private sector groups vying for these economic rents, a fact that 
undermines its autonomy. As a result, it is unable to adjust its economic 
policies and resolve or even arrest distortions associated with import 
substitution. The state's contribution to ISI's decline is a consequence of its
’ ’^Quoring Albert Hirschman, " The Turn to Authoritarianism and the Search for Economic 
Determinants", in David Collier ( ed. ), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America ( Princeton; 
Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 73-74 , in Henri J. Barkey (b), Tire State and the Industrialisation 
Crisis in Turkey , ( Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1990 ).
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inaction, which exacerbates the adverse conditions and indirectly prepares 
the ground for the armed forces to intervene...".^^^
Carlos Waisman argues that the relationship between 
capitalism and democracy is mediated by the strength of markets; that is to 
say, an institutionalised market economy is conducive to a stable liberal 
democracy, but autarkic economies ( private ownership of the means of 
production ), in a context of substantial restrictions on the operation of 
market mechanisms, is not.212
Although the policy of autarkic industrialisation based on 
import substitution is initiated by an autonomous state, the 
institutionalisation of the policy generates a web of vested interests of a 
rent'Seeking capitalist class, middle and working classes, whose survival 
depends on the maintenance of market restrictions. 213
The long-term result of autarkic, import-substitution 
industrialisation is the weakening and decline of economy, caused by the 
sharp economic fluctuations of balance of payments crises and low growth 
rates. However, the capitalist class increase their ability by institutionalising 
various privileges, such as high tariff and non tariff barriers, cheap credits 
from government banks, subsidised inputs, guaranteed demand through 
government contracts, export subsidies, and export markets assured by 
bilateral trade agreements.21^  This is the guarantor for high profits with low 
risks.
-^^Hcnri J. Barkcy, ( 1990 b ), pp. 23.
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Another long-term outcome of autarkic ISI is illegitimacy 
caused by the stagnant economy and the organised mass mobilisation of 
the urban lower classes and the intelligentsia( students, frustrated 
professionals and intellectuals ). Thus, declining economy and mass 
radicalism prepare the stage for a revolutionary situation- military rule, or in 
few cases, successful revolutionT^^ This revolutionary situation is also the 
first path to the generation of a social structure more compatible with 
competitive capitalism, and even, perhaps to liberal democracyT'^
The Turkish case resembles what Waisman and Hirschman 
pointed out earlier. Private sector in Turkey depended on the policies of 
the state , from which economic rents were generated. Thus, there was the 
tendency of the private sector to influence policy choices. Moreover, private 
sector was divided in itself , around such policies as protectionism and ISI, 
foreign trade and exchange rate policy, banks and bank credits, direct 
foreign investments, and land and tax reform.^l^ The fight for maximising 
economic rents gave rise to cleavages and conflict within the body of private 
sector and made it very difficult for this sector to escape from its short-term 
goals and guarantee long-term prosperity. Any notion of consensus between 
the various groups of the private sector had completely no affinity to the 
notion of cooperation. If opposition to devaluations and consensus on the 
issue of foreign exchange availabilities was the sign of a temporary demise of 
suspicion and hostility, obsession with rent maximisation never managed to 
escape from the acrimony of the private sector.^^^
- ' ’ Ibid., pp. 506'507. 
pp. 514.
‘ Henri Barkev, ( 1990 b ), pp. 112. 
- '% id .,p p . 139.
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Since rent maximisation was dependent on state policies, the 
private sector cleavages and the fragmentation of the Turkish party system, 
with the consequence of a proliferation of political parties representing 
different interests, played a crucial role in the affection and manipulation of 
state's autonomy. Increasing societal demands put the state under the 
pressure of implementing this excession, and rendered the state unable to 
implement the necessary orthodox policies for the dislocation of
Although the 1970 stabilisation measures had demonstrated 
that there was a remedy to the country's problems, the collapse of the 
economy in 1979 opened the path for the military to come as the guardian 
of the national interest and the state autonomy.
In open and competing political systems, political parties and 
other forms of representation of the differentiated societal interests 
constitutes a dangerous force , if the state is unable to preserve its 
autonomy. Therefore, the economic and political crises were attributed to 
the weak autonomy of the state which had been captured by the historical 
cleavage of centre vs. periphery, the state vs. political elites and the cultural 
and economic cleavages which prevented any form of compromise and 
responsibility either between the politicians or between different interest 
and pressure groups of the Turkish society.
Therefore, military intervention should be seen as the melting 
pot of economic, social and political crises, as well as the weakening of 
state's autonomy and its inability to impose orthodox and rational policies 
for preventing the polarisation, fragmentation and degeneration of the
219Ibid.,pp. 168.
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system, the possible coup d'état, and the fragility and difficulty of a 
transition to civilian politics and a consolidation of democracy.
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CONCLUSION
A. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 1960 AND 1980
MILITARY INTERVENTIONS
The breakdown of democracy in Turkey and the periodic 
military interventions ( 1960,1971, 1980) should be first elaborated on the 
grounds of the nature of the military intervention and its relation to crisis 
situation. According to Stephan and Linz ( 1978 )“ °, breakdowns are not 
inevitable consequences of socio-economic factors, but rather they are due 
to purely political factors. Breakdowns are associated with certain attitudes 
of elites; more precisely, breakdowns are the outcomes of a combination 
between the polarisation, fragmentation and degeneration of the system, 
and the failure of the state/ political elites to handle the crisis, before 
taking extreme forms.
Following this line of thinking, the crisis that opened the path 
to the 1960 military intervention could have been easily avoided ; as there 
was no large ideological gap between the RPP and the DP , the polarisation 
between the parties was only artificially maintained. The authoritaritarian 
measures of the DP had as their ultimate aim the prevention of the RPP 
from coming to power; this was consequently followed by reactions coming 
from the RPP; and finally, the tension between the two parties unfolded 
itself into a crisis situation. The concessions to religious groups, made by 
the DP , were another element of frustration for the statist and strongly
J. Lim and Alfred Stepan ( eds. ), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America , 
( Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Universit^^ Press, 1978 ).
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secularist RPP. What ought to be the solution for this situation was the 
holding of free elections and the abolishment of the authoritarian measures 
of the DP rule. However, the political elites- represented by the DP- and the 
state elites - represented by the RPP- failed to reach an accommodation.
The 1980 coup d'état was again the result of a lack of 
accommodation between the elites . Increasing violence, terrorism, 
polarisation and the Kurdish problem had made the military felt more 
threatened and pressured by the obligation to save the state from this more 
serious crisis than that of the late 1950s. The cooperation of the RPP and 
the JP with the " semiloyal " oppositions of the NSP and the NAP had 
increased the levels of polarisation; an explosive system had been created 
where the anti-systemic parties were not only within the parliament, but 
also within the government. If a grand coalition between the RPP and the 
JP had happened- as it was the wish of the civil society institutions- the 
military would not perhaps have intervened. Therefore, it was again the 
inability of the party elites and the leadership of the parties to prevent the 
situation of the crisis and violence that opened the path to a military coup.
In the light of both military interventions in 1960 and 1980 
regime vulnerability and military coups should be understood with their 
linkages to a web of explanatory paths which incorporate such " themes " 
as historical and cultural legacies, the failure of democracy , political 
vacuums and low political culture, and the inability of the state to preserv’e
its autonomy. 221
‘"'^William Thompson, " Regime Vulnerability and the Military Coup ", in Comparative Politics , 7: July 
1^75, pp. 459-487.
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Therefore, in both military interventions , the army came into 
the political stage with a historical heritage rooted back in the Ottoman 
times. The Turkish military have always considered themselves as an elite 
group; that is to say, a highly educated and organised social group moving 
into the higher spectrums of the Turkish history. Furthermore, they carry 
the qualities of honour, honesty, bravery, altruism, uniformity, and 
neutrality. People respect the military because they are the ones who put 
their lives in danger for protecting the whole nation from internal and 
external threats. Thus, they enjoy a high esteem in the eyes of the people. 
The military also tries to present themselves as the supporters of the 
Atatürk's world view and conception of democracy; the rationalist 
democracy. This was a model combining elitism and democratic principles. 
It was actually the dream of Atatürk to upraise political democracy in the 
long run by turning power to the people who had achieved the elevation to 
the higher levels of the contemporary Western civilisation and rationality. 
Therefore, each military intervention was justified by the army as the effort 
to restore a malfunctioning democracy , or to lead people again to the path 
of reason and democracy as they were the ones who possessed the quality of 
high rationality.
During the process of transition to civilian politics, both 
military regimes tried to preserve their autonomy and to gain a path of 
influence on the new civilian political system. Therefore, they looked for 
the creation of some " exit guarantees which would be institutionalised 
in the Constitution.
""‘ Samuel Hunrington, The Third Wave: Democrarisarion in the Late Twenrieth Century' , ( Norman 
and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993 ), pp. 215' 217.
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However, there w’ere also important differences betw’een the 
tw'o military interventions. The 1960 coup had been made by middle-rank 
officers while the 1980 coup w'as a hierarchical and from the above 
movement wTich incorporated all top-ranking officers. The army in the 
1980s had learned from the past that the 1960 coup had malfunctioned as 
the higher ranks had not accepted the orders of the lower ranks.
According to the classification provided by Nordlinger, the 
1960 coup was a guardian type of regime with the conservative goals of 
preserving the status quo, maintaining the balance of power among the 
contending groups, enforcing the political and constitutional ground rules, 
staving off practically any kind of important change in the distribution of 
economic rewards, and ensuring political order and governmental stability. 
Therefore, the 1960 coup makers limited themselves in making a 
constitution and an electoral law. On the other hand, the 1980 coup was a 
ruler type of regime, which not only w'as instrumental in changing the 
Constitution , but also fundamental laws concerning the social and political 
set , and managed to control and regulate a much greater area than the 
1960 ancestors
The 1960 military intervention was based on a collaboration 
betw'een the National Security Council and the RPP, especially after the 
liquidation of the fourteen radicals who w-ere opposed to the RPP and were 
advocating a longer stay for the military ( four to five years ). The 
collaboration of the army with certain civilian institutions and a political 
party was best expressed in the formation of the Constituent Assembly,
¡20
which was composed of the National Unity Committee of the military and 
the House of Representatives , dominated by the RPP.
On the other hand, the 1980 military intervention came with 
or for the support of no party. The neutrality of the 1980 army was due to 
the dissatisfaction of the military with what they perceived as the 
malfunctioning political parties and the irresponsible politicians. Thus, the 
N SC abolished all political parties of the pre-1980 military intervention and 
banned the political activities of the traditional political figures. The NSC 
also did not use so many civilian advisors like the 1960 coup; rather, it 
preferred the combination of military elements and high technocrats.
B. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO CONSTITUTIONS:
1961 AND 1982
The transition to civilian politics both in 1961 and 1983 was 
implemented after the preparation of new Constitutions. It is important to 
note that in both military interventions ( 1960 and 1980 ), the military had 
come for a short period of time. However, their withdrawal from the 
political scene was based on the assumption that they had come as the 
saviours of democracy, and not as the ones blamed for the breakdown of 
the regime. The inadequate and malfunctioning administration of the 
country by the political elites had weakened state authority and the country 
had been dragged into a crisis situation. Thus, their aim was not the re­
establishment of the democracy of the past; rather, they aimed at the re­
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structuring of the political system in such a way, that a viable and healthy 
democracy would prevent a future military intervention.
The legalistic obsession of the state and the political elites, that 
all problems emerge out of the inadequacy of the laws and the Constitution, 
and that the remedy to all problems is hidden in the Constitution, was the 
driving force for the making of new constitutions in each period, as a 
reaction to the inadequacy of its ancestor.
The context within which the Constitution was made, and its 
content have been one of the central themes of this study. My objective was 
to find out what kind of " democracy " the military wanted to establish. 
The experience of the authoritarian rule of the DP, the supremacy of the 
legislature of the 1924 Constitution, and the collaboration of the state elites- 
the military and the state bureaucratic intellengtsia , as represented by the 
RPP were the main factors that led to the transformation from a 
majoritarian and authoritative conception of democracy to the pluralistic 
conception of democracy, advocated by the 1961 Constitution. However, 
the " excessive permissiveness " with regard to human rights and freedoms, 
and the " excessive " limitations imposed on the executive of the 1961 
Constitution, as well as the fact that the military had acted as the only and 
true state elite, were the driving forces for the implementation of the 1982 
Constitution, which introduced the global projection of a new citizenry and 
political system, based on the solidarity and autonomy of the state as well as 
a very vague and easy to be criticised conception of democracy.
-- ■ Ergun Özbudun, Demokrasiye Geçiş Sürecinde Anayasa Yapımı ( Ankara: Bilgi Yavınevi, 1993 ), pp. 
58A9.
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The 1961 Constitution was a liberal constitution, advocating a 
participatory and pluralistic democracy based on the balance of powers. 
The introduction of state institutions as the authorised agencies through 
which the nation would exercise its sovereignty was the inauguration of a 
democratic model guaranteed with such political " devices " as the division 
and checks and balances between the state powers and institutions, the 
judicial independence and the judicial review of the political decision 
organs, and the balance between the centralised administration and 
autonomous institutions ( TRT, universities ). Although a notion of 
" trusteeship " may be criticised, under democratic principles, in the 1961 
Constitution, having in mind the inclusion of political bodies which are not 
based on popular elections ( a portion of the Senate and the N SC ), the 
general liberal character of the 1961 Constitution still remains. Actually, 
what had been criticised as " excessive permisiveness " with regard to 
human rights was- as Bülent Tanör argues- the effort of the constitution to 
introduce in the society the concept of " the culture of the constitution ",· 
that is to say, its social influence on the introduction of collective rights and 
freedoms ( trade unions, strikes, collective bargaining ); its political 
influence on the creation of a participatory democracy ( pressure groups, 
politicisation of public opinion, new political parties ); and its legal influence 
on the creation of the legal conditions for everybody fighting for the 
preservation of his/her legal rights.--'’
The 1982 Constitution had a more restrictive character 
compared to the 1961 Constitution. On the legal grounds, the 1982
’^ '^Bülenc Tanör, ( 1994 ), pp. 83"84.
1 2 3
Constitution tried to find solutions which would never damaged state 
autonomy, even if this meant restrictions imposed on individual freedoms. 
On the political grounds, the same authoritative tendency is present; civil 
society had been restricted from producing political alternatives and had 
been taken under the protective umbrella of the State Law ( Devlet 
Hukuku ); now it is the State Law that produces politics.-’  ^ Therefore, the 
essence of the new Constitution was authoritarian and statist, within the 
context of general democratic rules. The function of the constitution was 
not the construction of a completely new social and political system, driven 
by the state forces and frozen for the preservation of the state. Thus, the 
Constitution is no more the protective umbrella of the ruled; but rather, of 
the rulers.
The reformist character of the 1980 military intervention and 
the global projection of the 1982 Constitution lies in the fact that the 
military no longer trusted the bureaucratic intelligentsia. The politicisation 
of the bureaucracy, its political polarisation and fragmentation during the 
1970s and the shift of the RPP under the chairmanship of Ecevit to the left- 
of-centre w'ere the lethal blows in the collapse of the traditional state elite 
role of the bureaucracy and the RPP.--^
“^^Ibid., pp. 149.
the works of Metin Heper, ( 1985 ), pp. lOS-llT; and Ahmet Evin, " Changing Patterns of 
Cleavages Before and After 1930 " , in The State. Military and Democracy: Turkey in the 1980s . Metin 
Heper and Ahmet Evin ( ed s.), ( Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988 ), pp. 211.
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C. EPILOGUE
When I first started working on the subject of military 
interventions in Turkey, I could not imagine how complicated was the 
process of analysing the whole web of social, political, historical, legal and 
economic relations and combining the right pieces of this puzzle for finding 
a single answer to a single question. Although the problématique of my 
master's thesis was the role of the military in Turkish politics in the light of 
examining the military interventions of 1960 and 1980, the task to find an 
answ'er to the question of whether the military act as decision-makers or as 
guardians of democracy necessitated the analytical examination of the 
political scene of its period, the civ il-military relations, the programs of the 
military rule, and especially the formulation and essence of constitutions, 
which w'ere proved to be instrumental devices for the transitional periods.
I would argue that political reality opens the path for the 
combination of the tw^ o parts of my hypothetical answ^er: the Turkish 
military act both as decision-makers and guardians of democracy. Actually, 
a more realistic and precise formulation of the above thesis would be 
necessary. Thus, the military intervened as the guardian of democracy and 
acted as decision-maker for implementing the real aim of being the guardian 
of the state authority. The notion of " guardianship of democracy " served 
as a protective umbrella in the implementation of their aims. They needed a 
source of legitimacy in the eyes of the people for preventing political 
uprisings that would make their task of restructuring the political system 
difficult; and, democracy- being a sensitive issue for all people wanting a
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liberal and pluralistic context of participation- was the best guarantee for 
the military.
The strong state tradition of Turkish politics and the evolution 
of the centre- periphery cleavage into a cleavage between the state and 
political elites are crucial factors in searching the role of the military not in 
the realm of " power-seekers ", but in the political realm, where decision - 
making and guardianship of the state are combined in a delicate way. 
Although there is no intention of approving and applauding military 
interventions, I do believe that the certain military interventions were the 
inevitable outcomes of a lack of consensus between the state and political 
elites of this country, as well as the outcomes of an elitist political tradition.
In Turkish politics, consensus and compromise are values that 
never constitute principals of political elites. The antagonism between them 
is nothing but a zero-sum game; that is to say, there is the perception that 
only a winner and looser is in the final line of the political race. 
Unfortunately, the past crisis situations in Turkey were mainly 
characterised by this " political philosophy " with no effort of reconciliation. 
Government was supposed to be the winner and the opposition played the 
role of the looser. Thus, the rules of the political game were not contacted 
on the basis of rationality, but rather on the basis of a sentimental 
animosity leading to the malfunctioning of the system.
The historical animosity and antagonism between the state and 
political elites is based on the same tradition of lack of consensus and 
compromise. The military and the bureaucracy always perceived themselves 
as the guardians of the state, because they had the best qualifications for
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this task: the elitist approach of being the most rational and the most 
educated. Their mistrust for the political elites never prevented them from 
attacking the work of politicians. Therefore, military interventions in 
Turkey were acts of reaction to the inadequacy of politicians; they were the 
product of the belief that the system needed a rational re-structuring for 
gaining its viability and increasing its resistance to any possible future 
interventions.
Therefore, I would argue that the military never escaped from 
the cave of considering itself the only elite and the only guardian of the 
state autonomy, who would never hesitate to use its force for intervening in 
the sake of protecting the state. Military interventions, being such complex 
political matters with deep roots in the political history of Turkey, can only 
be understood in the light of accepting the military as both guardians and 
decision-makers.
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